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INTRODUCTION
The early tenure of the Trump Administration has featured
robust challenges to the deference that courts have traditionally
accorded the political branches in immigration law.' In June 2017,
the Supreme Court's per curiam stay order 2 regarding President
1. That deference extends back to 1889, when the Supreme Court held that
Congress had plenary power over immigration. See Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) [hereinafter The Chinese Exclusion Case]; see also
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952) (asserting that decisions of
political branches on immigration are "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference"); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing "political branches' broad power over the creation and administration of the
immigration system"). Compare David A. Martin, Why Immigration 's Plenary
Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 44 (2015) (discussing the most
plausible arguments for judicial deference), with Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in
the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era oflmmigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (2015) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions
relying on constitutional values in interpreting immigration statutes heralded
eventual demise of deference).
2. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (ruling that
noncitizens abroad otherwise affected by refugee EO were exempted if they had
"bona fide relationship" with U.S. person or entity); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 34, 34 (2017), aff'd, IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (declining to stay portion of
district court order barring government from enforcing EO against, inter alia,
noncitizens abroad granted refugee status and possessing "bona fide relationship"
with U.S. person or entity, including U.S. spouse, parent, child, mother or father-in-
law, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, and cousin, while staying
2 2018
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Trump's second Executive Order (EO-2) on refugees and nationals
of six countries3 did something unprecedented for that tribunal: It
crafted an injunction that in effect required the admission of a
substantial number of foreign nationals that the executive branch had
wished to exclude. The indefinite restrictions in EO-2's successor,
EO-3, present another challenge to judicial deference. Deference
was also under attack in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,' in which the
Supreme Court cited equal protection principles in striking down a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that imposed
a gender test on citizenship acquired by persons born out of wedlock
abroad to one U.S citizen parent. These doctrinal stresses call for a
new model of judicial review, which this Article calls shared
stewardship.
Invocation of stewardship over immigration law fits the
subject's potential for change and growth. The formulation of criteria
for the classification, admission, and removal of noncitizens requires
the engagement of the federal government to fulfill what Hamilton
called the "guardianship of the public safety." 6 Immigration policy's
impact on public safety is generally the province of the political
branches, which have the information, resources, and capacity for
quick response necessary for this task.' Moreover, the political
portion of district court order exempting from EO refugees who merely had "formal
assurance" of sponsorship from U.S. refugee resettlement agency).
3. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,210 (Mar. 6,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-protecting-
nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-2 [https://perma.cc/2BPG-FNT2]
(suspending refugee admissions for 120 days and admission of nationals of Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for ninety days) [hereinafter EO-2]. On
September 24, 2017, as the provisions of EO-2 were about to expire, President
Trump issued a new Proclamation imposing an indefinite ban on entry of most
immigrants and some countries from an adjusted list of countries. See Proclamation
No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept. 24, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-
enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-
terrorists-public-safety-threats/ [https://perma.cc/92ZJ-ZUJY] [hereinafter EO-3].
4. See EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,212. As of October 23, 2017, two
U.S. district courts had issued temporary restraining orders of varying scope
regarding EO-3. See IRAP v. Trump, No. TDC-17-0361, 2017 U.S. Dist. Lexis
171879 *1, *141-42 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-99959, 2017
U.S. Dist. Lexis 171242 *1, *13-14 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1679 (2017).
6. See TiE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
7. See IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (granting partial stay of lower court
injunctions against refugee EO, asserting that "preserving national security is 'an
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branches' electoral accountability situates them well to make
substantive immigration decisions that shape the composition of
community in the United States.' For example, this country might
wish to promote family reunification but determine that only spousal,
parent-child, or sibling relationships suffice.' Because those
decisions about immigration pnionities relate to the fundamental
character of the polity itself, such decisions are properly the province
of Congress-a broadly representative body that the Framers
designed to solicit, consider, and implement community concerns.o
Congress has also delegated facets of immigration authority to
the executive branch." For example, in a provision invoked by
urgent objective of the highest order') (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010)); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing "broad power" over immigration); see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing
Executive's capacity for "dispatch" and "[d]ecision" (efficient decision making));
see generally Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 105 (2014) (applying Hamilton's perspective to contemporary questions of
executive power over immigration); cf Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact
Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009) (analyzing factors contributing to judicial
deference to executive decisions).
8. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LoST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2006); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE 62 (1983) (noting deep roots of "rule of citizens over non-
citizens, of members over strangers"); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and
the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1069-70 (1994);
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341,
370-71 (2008); but see BONNI HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 40 (2001)
(suggesting that newcomers-even those who enter community without members'
prior consent-can revise and expand conception of democracy "beyond . . .
(national) borders" and transcend limiting narrative of "unified demos stabilized by
a metaphorics of national kinship"); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Federalism, and
Political Freedom, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 83, 89-93 (James
E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (arguing that unrestricted migration
encourages individuals to acquire and share information about political units and
thus tends to enhance public good of sound governance).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2011) (defining "Immediate
Relatives," such as spouses, certain parents, and children of U.S. citizen sponsors,
who are not subject to annual limits on immigration).
10. See TE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 7, at 424 (describing legislature
as best suited to "conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their
privileges and interests").
11. For example, Congress has looked to State Department consular
officials abroad to implement Congress's guidance about the issuance of visas. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (setting out "[s]ecurity and related grounds" for inadmissibility,
including "[tierrorist activities"); see also Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-
4 2018
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President Trump, Congress has given the President a measure of
discretion to bar the entry of "any aliens or of any class of aliens"
whose admission would be "detrimental to the interests of the United
States."l2 Presidents have used this power to pursue objectives such
as negotiations with foreign states on immigration policy.13
However, in immigration as elsewhere, the executive branch
should use its delegated power to further Congress's "overall
statutory scheme."l4 Executive branch measures that instead
undermine that plan exceed the scope of Congress's delegation.
Moreover, the political branches' zeal for public safety, or a
prevailing vision of community composition, should not foster what
Hamilton called a "spirit of injustice."15 That toxic spirit would
heedlessly exclude newcomers to the United States or ignore
newcomers' ties to U.S. persons and institutions. Guarding against
such excesses, the courts must take a share in stewardship.
As is often case with judicial review, the sticking point is the
level of review required. In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, insisted on the close means-end
nexus typically required of measures based on suspect or quasi-
suspect attributes such as gender.16 According to Justice Ginsburg, to
justify such legislation, the government "must show ... 'that the
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives
and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
70 (1972) (applying deferential "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard to
adjudicate First Amendment challenge to visa denial); Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2141
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (deferring to consular decisions about inadmissibility
based on national security grounds).
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); cf IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir.
2017) (reading § 1182(f) narrowly as not authorizing revised refugee EO); cert.
granted and stayed in part, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017); vacated as moot, 138 S.
Ct. 353, 353 (2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 777 (9th Cir. 2017) (reading
§ 1182(f) narrowly), cert. granted and stayed in part sub nom IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at
2080; vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. at 353; Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th
Cir. 2017) (interpreting § 1182(f) narrowly).
13. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 165, 188 (1993)
(holding that proclamation pursuant to § 1182(f) authorizing interdiction of refugees
at sea was not prohibited by INA); sources cited infra note 300.
14. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citing FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).
15. See TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed.); see also TE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 257-58 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed.) (recommending that "[a] wise nation" minimize "both the necessity
and the danger of resorting to [any means] . . . which may be inauspicious to its
liberties").
16. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
5
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to the achievement of those objectives."'" Applying this standard,
the Court struck down a provision of the INA that required U.S.
citizen mothers, compared with fathers, to be physically present in
the United States for a shorter period to ensure that children born out
of wedlock overseas acquired citizenship at birth. However, the
Court expressly declined to apply this robust means-end test to the
admission of foreign nationals." Signaling the durability of gender-
based tests for admission of foreign nationals, Justice Ginsburg cited
Congress's "exceptionally broad power" in this realm. "
Unfortunately, besides citing this history, Justice Ginsburg said
little about how or why to distinguish the close means-end fit
required in Morales-Santana from the more casual means-end fit
expected of gender classifications elsewhere in immigration law. The
Morales-Santana Court's lack of guidance seems all the more
puzzling in light of the painstaking provisional remedy regarding the
admission of noncitizens that the Court imposed just weeks later in
the litigation surrounding President Trump's EO-2.20 Shared
stewardship offers a more cohesive model for justifying the
heightened review in Morales-Santana and determining the level of
review that is appropriate in other areas. Those additional areas
include President Trump's EO-3, "extreme vetting" of foreign
nationals abroad, and retroactive application of grounds for removal
that can result in the deportation of longtime legal residents of the
United States.21
Current judicial and academic accounts of judicial review in
immigration law have not provided this cohesive account. As the thin
explanation in Morales-Santana demonstrates, the Court itself has
failed to offer a theory that justifies why certain measures receive
searching judicial scrutiny, while others receive deference. The many
judicial references to the "broad power" of Congress or the
discretion wielded by the Executive have not crystallized into a
persuasive approach. By the same token, the "normalization" thesis
offered by many immigration scholars 22 fails to comprehensively
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1693.
19. Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 794 (1977)).
20. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (exempting foreign
nationals from the revised EO if they had a "bona fide relationship" with a U.S.
person or entity).
21. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-89 (1952).
22. See Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good
Victims: Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal
6 2018
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address the countervailing normative factors that courts should
consider. Under the normalization thesis, courts should simply treat
immigration measures as they would domestic legislation or
administrative action. However, while the most thoughtful
normalization theorists agree that in some subset of cases a nexus
with foreign affairs should trigger heightened deference, in practice,
normalization theorists unduly discount the foreign affairs role.23
To offer a cohesive normative account that fills the gaps left by
immigration case law and commentary,24 shared stewardship relies
Images, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 559 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law
and the Principle ofPlenary Congressional Power, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 262 (1984)
(asserting that "it ignores reality to hold that every provision concerned with
immigration, as applied to every fact situation it might encompass, is so intimately
rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the
effective conduct of foreign relations"); Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating
"Immigration Law ", 68 FLA. L. REv. 179, 225 (2016) (offering the "normalization"
thesis); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
339, 339 (2002); cf David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 583, 614-18 (2017) (discussing premises of
normalization thesis while arguing for more complex normative and descriptive
account).
23. For example, in one of the most thoughtful articulations of the
normalization approach, Professor Legomsky has argued that judicial deference may
be appropriate, but only in "the special case in which the court concludes ... that
applying the normal standards of review would interfere with the conduct of foreign
policy." Legomsky, supra note 22, at 6. One can read Professor Legomsky's caveat
in one of two ways. Perhaps Professor Legomsky was recommending that courts
consider whether the broad range of cases like the matter at issue were likely to
affect foreign relations in some fashion. This approach actually bears some kinship
to the shared stewardship model, although under the latter a challenger would also
have to show the presence of other factors. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying
text. However, one could also read Professor Legomsky's caveat as requiring a
judicial assessment of the foreign policy merits of a challenged measure. Of course,
the latter reading would undermine the whole point of deference, which is to
delegate assessment of the substantive merits to another entity besides the courts.
24. Another account, the "hybrid" model offered by Professors Rubenstein
and Gulasekaram, is an exceptionally promising approach that has widened analysis
of factors relevant to judicial review. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 22,
at 646. However, that breadth stems from the conclusion that immigration law
includes too many factors to distill into a single approach. In that sense, although the
hybrid model may well capture nuances that shared stewardship fails to address, the
hybrid model describes those nuances at the expense of venturing a single normative
account that will provide optimal guidance to courts and commentators. For better
and worse, that latter goal is the ambition of the shared stewardship model advanced
here. A model proposed recently, the "two-principals" approach, regards executive
discretion over imnigration as of equal importance to Congress's power. See Adam
B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE L.J. 104, 104 (2015). However, although this model has also advanced debate
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on three factors to trigger heightened review: (1) degree of sovereign
interest;2 5 (2) number and intensity of collateral impacts; and (3)
absence of intelligible limits. When courts find an attenuated
sovereign interest, substantial collateral impacts on U.S. persons or
entities, and no intelligible limits, courts should apply a more
searching brand of review, requiring a tighter means-end fit between
the challenged measure and its putative objectives. Often, application
of that more rigorous standard would result in invalidation of the
measure at issue. Conversely, a looser means-end fit would suffice
when there is a significant sovereign interest supporting the measure,
collateral impacts are few or nonexistent, and limits on the measure
are intelligible. In that event, courts would generally uphold the
measure, and let the political process adjudicate its fate.
The three factors that drive the shared stewardship approach
require additional explanation. The sovereign interest of the United
States inheres both in substantive admission and removal criteria and
the probability and gravity of foreign relations consequences. In a
democracy, substantive criteria for both admission and removal are
at the heart of sovereignty.2 6 When Congress has provided a
comprehensive framework, courts owe that framework a measure of
deference. Moreover, the executive branch's initiatives should be
largely interstitial, filling gaps without undermining Congress's
overarching structure. The exercise of "predictive judgment" 27 by the
Executive about the probability and gravity of adverse diplomatic or
security consequences should elicit a measure of judicial deference,
particularly when those judgments concern events overseas.
However, courts should not clothe all immigration rules in crucial
in useful ways, it is incomplete since it offers few consistent guideposts to
distinguish between the actions of specific presidential administrations. A model
that views President Obama as a co-principal of Congress can hardly deny that role
to President Trump. To the extent that the two principals approach distinguishes
between the actions of presidents based on case-by-case analysis, the model dilutes
its distinctive claim of full presidential partnership. Moreover, the two principals
model by definition has little to say about constitutional limits on the authority of
Congress. In this respect, the shared stewardship approach offers further guidance.
25. Shared stewardship's framing of this concern owes a debt to Professor
Legomsky's approach. See Legomsky, supra note 22, at 262. The Article's effort to
credit executive branch concerns owes much to the work of David Martin. See
generally Martin, supra note 1; David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in
the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165
(1983).
26. See WALZER, supra note 8, at 61; see also infra notes 147-50 and
accompanying text (citing sources).
27. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
8 2018
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sovereign interests that may not fit the particular context the courts
encounter.
To demonstrate that more robust review of means-end fit is
appropriate, a challenger of an immigration measure should also
address the collateral impact of that measure. In the last forty years,
that factor has been more salient in the Court's consideration of state
measures affecting immigration than in analyzing the
constitutionality of the INA itself For example, during the past term
the Court, in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,28 read the INA's
removal grounds to promote clarity regarding the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions, in part to promote fair and
efficient plea bargaining in the criminal justice system.2 9 Addressing
state laws that seek to wrest the initiative in immigration
enforcement from the federal government, the Court has cautioned
that such measures could have consequences for trade, investment,
travel, and diplomacy.3 0
Collateral impacts have not figured as heavily in assessing the
constitutionality of federal immigration laws, in part because of the
historical deference shown to Congress by the courts, which often
casts collateral impacts as by-products that Congress has duly
considered and found not to be dispositive.3 1 However, on the rare
occasions when the Court has invalidated federal immigration
statutes, one can find gestures to collateral consequences. In INS v.
Chadha,3 2 the Court asserted that permitting a one-house legislative
veto to overrule executive decisions on immigration relief would
encourage hasty, heedless, or malicious laws, undercutting the "due
deliberation" that Hamilton sought in the legislative process.3 3 i
28. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
29. Id. at 1568; see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2017)
(citing Padilla in vacating a plea based on the defendant's receipt of inaccurate
information from his lawyer regarding the immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction, even when evidence that prosecution would introduce at trial was
overwhelming); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (holding that
defendant's receipt of clear and competent advice about the immigration
consequences of a plea is one element in effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment); Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and
Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1057 (2017)
(noting the Court's concern for the orderly functioning of criminal justice).
30. See Arizonav. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012).
31. See generally Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
32. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
33. Id. at 947-48 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 458 (Alexander
Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
9
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Sessions v. Morales-Santana,34 Justice Ginsburg supported the
Court's invalidation of a gender-based statute on acquired citizenship
by noting the overall "constraining impact" of gender-based
stereotypes on human aspirations.3 5 Shared stewardship would
promote closer consideration of collateral impacts in assessing the
scope of Congress's delegation to the executive branch and in
constitutional review of immigration statutes, particularly when such
statutes undermine long-standing reliance interests.
Courts should also consider whether the power exemplified by
a challenged action or measure contains a coherent limiting
principle. The imposition of appropriate "external ... [and] internal
controls" that both enable and constrain government is perhaps the
central project of American constitutionalism.3 6 Case law on judicial
deference to Congress regarding immigration too often invokes the
risks of imposing limits on Congress's power.37 Here too, however,
there are glimmerings of a different approach in recent cases. In
Zadvydas v. Davis,3 8 the Court cited the Constitution's abhorrence of
indefinite detention in holding that the INA permitted only 180 days
of detention for a former lawful permanent resident (LPR) awaiting
execution of a final order of removal because of criminal
convictions.3 9 To best vindicate the Framers' vision and extend the
34. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
35. Id. at 1692-93.
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (also noting that "[i]n framing a government ... you must first enable the
govermment to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself').
37. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
38. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
39. Id. at 682. Cf Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531-33 (2003) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (asserting that mandatory detention of an LPR pending adjudication
of removability due to criminal convictions was appropriate because the detention
would typically be for a reasonable period bounded by issuance of a final order of
removal, but leaving open the legality of protracted detention caused by
"unreasonable delay" on government's part). In the October 2017 Term, the Court
reheard oral argument in a case involving allegations of inappropriate delay pending
adjudication of removability. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016). This
Article will not discuss detention in depth since the Court's decision will surely
provide insights useful for future commentary. Similarly, this Article will defer
consideration of whether the Due Process Clause permits restricting the procedural
safeguards that govern removal of foreign nationals who are arriving at a port of
entry or have recently arrived. Compare Castro v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security,
835 F.3d 422, 424-28 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1581 (2017) (asserting
that application of minimal safeguards applicable to "expedited removal" is
10 2018
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wisdom of cases like Zadvydas, shared stewardship would elevate
the importance of intelligible limits in determining the level of
means-end fit required.4 0
Shared stewardship yields fresh insights on current issues in
immigration jurisprudence. A shared stewardship analysis would
find that the indefinite restrictions in President Trump's EO-3
exceeded the power delegated by Congress to the President.
Congress's demarcation in the INA of the United States' sovereign
interest hinged on the rejection of discriminatory national origin
quotas and the prioritization of family reunification.4 1 Here, EO-3's
indefinite restrictions contrast with the temporary pause in that
measure's predecessor, EO-2. While EO-2's brief pause to acquire
more information4 2 did not undermine Congress's comprehensive
immigration framework, EO-3's indefinite ban on admission of
permissible for noncitizens apprehended one mile north of the U.S.-Mexico border),
with Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, "Vast Hordes . .. Crowding in Upon Us":
The Executive Branch's Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan
Ping, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 185, 193 (2015) (critiquing harshness and risk of error in
expedited removal).
40. Intelligible limits may also demonstrate that even when the Court
reviews a measure under a stricter standard, that measure is narrowly tailored
enough to pass muster. Shared stewardship would consider this factor at an earlier
stage, as demonstrating that Congress or the President had shown sufficient self-
restraint to obviate the need for more searching judicial scrutiny.
41. S. REP. No. 89-748, at 13 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3328, 3332 [hereinafter 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report] (declaring that
"[r]eunification of families is to be the foremost consideration" in visa allocation
and rejecting national origin quotas as lacking the "required degree of flexibility" in
promoting family reunification).
42. Imperfect information is a perennial issue in immigration law and
policy. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017) (detailing false
statements by asylum applicant); see also Martin, supra note 25, at 184 (noting that
in asylum adjudication "[t]he decisionmaker must learn of events in a distant
country, as to which few witnesses are likely to be available here, other than the
applicant himself. This condition could be seen as an opportunity for the applicant,
permitting him to exaggerate past mistreatment by his home government, or, if he is
particularly unscrupulous, allowing him to fashion his claim of whole cloth . . .").
Relatively few visa applicants may exploit a decisionmaker's imperfect access to
information. However, the government's concern about this issue is not
unreasonable on its face. Cf Asylum: Additional Actions Needed to Assess and
Address Fraud Risks, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 3 (Dec. 2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/673941.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ4A-4S2L] (noting
that "asylum officers and immigration judges must make decisions, at times, with
little or no documentation to support or refute an applicant's claim. These factors
create a challenging environment in which adjudicators must attempt to reach the
best decisions they can with the information available").
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nationals from designated countries clashes with the INA's bar on
discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas.43 Without
adequate warrant from Congress, EO-3 installed a Middle Eastern
variation on the Asia-Pacific triangle quota system that Congress had
strictly abjured in the landmark 1965 immigration amendments.44
Moreover, as an indefinite ban on entry of nationals of the listed
countries, EO-3 lacks a limiting principle. No independent review or
neutral metric would stop this or any other Administration relying on
a similar theory from decreeing a de facto permanent ban on
immigration from any country found wanting. That unbridled power
poses a fundamental challenge to Congress's comprehensive
immigration "plan."
Shared stewardship also provides fresh insight on consular
"extreme vetting" of visa applicants and retroactive application of
removal grounds. Under the shared stewardship approach, the broad
discretion of consular officials becomes a source of concern,
enabling the evisceration of Congress's visa priorities. Basic
procedural fairness emerges as a valuable limit on the otherwise
limitless discretion that consular officials exercise. Those factors
lead to a critique of the Court's decision in Kerry v. Din4 5 as being
unduly deferential and point the way toward more searching review
of the "extreme vetting" that the Trump Administration has
promoted.
Shared stewardship also highlights the damage to the
substantive design of immigration law wrought by retroactive
application of removal grounds.46 If substantive immigration law
aims to shape the community in which we aspire to thrive, it should
reflect abiding values, including due regard for reliance interests.
Retroactive application unduly discounts the importance of those
reliance interests. Moreover, the collateral impact of retroactive
application compounds the "spirit of injustice"47 that Hamilton
identified with oppressive legislation. The spread of that toxic spirit
43. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
44. See 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 41, at 14
(noting that for several decades prior to passage of 1965 amendments, immigration
statutes had either absolutely barred the immigration and naturalization of Asians or
limited all visa applicants of Asian descent-including those who were nationals of
countries in other regions-to a total of 2,000 visas annually).
45. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)
(upholding retroactive application).
47. TE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
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deprives noncitizens of the stake they need to make optimal
contributions to U.S. society. The absence of intelligible limits on the
harshness of retroactive application, which can lead to the removal of
longtime legal U.S. residents, further exacerbates the problem.
This Article is in three Parts. Part I discusses stewardship in
immigration law, combining the Framers' insights with the wisdom
of formative cases. Part II discusses the factors driving shared
stewardship: sovereign interest, collateral impacts, and intelligible
limits. Part III applies the model to both current and abiding
immigration problems, including gender-based statutes, judicial
review of consular decisions, presidential discretion, and the
retroactivity of removal grounds. In each context, shared stewardship
seeks to nurture due deliberation on governance by each of the three
branches.
I. STEWARDSHIP, GOVERNANCE, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
IMMIGRATION LAW
Stewardship of an entity often comes down to one person, who
serves as a managing partner or chief executive. In U.S. political
history, Theodore Roosevelt's conception of presidential stewardship
is the best-known use of the term.48 However, one can also view
stewardship as a product of collaboration, or even of arms-length
coordination between different units with overlapping
responsibilities. A business organization may allocate duties between
a chief executive officer and a board of directors. In a republic,
branches with overlapping roles may be said to participate in a
scheme of shared stewardship.49
48. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (1922). Much of
the following discussion is adopted from Margulies, supra note 7, at 108.
49. One can argue that this conception merely restates the typical posture of
each of the three branches in U.S. constitutionalism. This Article's project is not
merely to restate the obvious, but to outline how the branches could and should
coexist in the distinctive domain of immigration law, where precedents often suggest
that courts play a lesser role than they do in the purely domestic sphere. Similarly,
because the model advanced here addresses the distinctive challenges posed by
immigration law, it coincides only in part with the work of scholars who have
outlined a "fiduciary" theory of democratic governance generally, and judging in
particular. See generally Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A
Fiduciary Theory ofJudging, 101 CALiF. L. REv. 699, 701-04 (2013) (discussing the
concept of judiciary accountability and judicial duties owed to the people).
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A. The Framers' Stewardship
Hamilton alluded to stewardship in a republic when he wrote in
Federalist No. 23 that "government ought to be clothed with all the
powers requisite to complete execution of its trust." 0 Based on this
model, Hamilton recommended that the government receive "the
most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its
charge."" Confirming the accuracy of the stewardship paradigm,
Hamilton readily conceded "the responsibility [of the federal
government] implied in the duty assigned to it"5 2 and identified the
federal government as "that body to which the guardianship of the
public safety is confided."5 3
For the Framers, the stewardship metaphor was particularly apt
because of the fluid nature of threats to the new republic and the
adjustments expected of officials fulfilling their governmental
responsibilities. As Hamilton warned, "it is impossible to foresee or
to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the
corresponding extent and variety of the means which may be
necessary to satisfy them."5 4 Madison recognized that risks
proliferated in the domain of foreign affairs. He warned that
safeguards built into the U.S. Constitution will not "chain the
ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations."" While
the United States and the fifty states that comprise it have a
monopoly on the use of force within U.S. borders and the ability to
use compulsory process to arrest lawbreakers on U.S. territory, the
country must depend on the good will of foreign governments when
acting abroad. Those foreign regimes may be hostile, fickle, or
simply unable to help.5 6 The political branches require some leeway
in meeting that challenge.
Nevertheless, Madison's conviction that the political branches
needed the means to guard against the "ambition" of hostile or
50. See TE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 6, at 149. The analysis here
also owes much to previous work. See Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance:
Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snow den,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23 (2014).
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 6, at 151.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 149.
55. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 15, at 253.
56. See Martin, supra note 1, at 42-44 (noting that "[i]n the international
arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory process or other reliable
coercive means under their own government's control").
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competing states did not mute his concern with the excessive
"ambition" of competing branches of the federal government.
Madison famously designed the distinct but overlapping domains of
the three branches to ensure that "[a]mbition must . . . counteract
ambition."57 In this vein, Madison observed that stewardship also
required protecting freedom from undue restraints. To defuse this
risk, Madison advised, "[a] wise nation" will minimize "both the
necessity and the danger of resorting to [any means] ... which may
be inauspicious to its liberties."5' Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78,
seconded Madison's point, cautioning against the "ill humors" 5
driven by short-term thinking that elevate the fortunes of a faction
today at the expense of liberty tomorrow.6 0
Hamilton had a ready remedy for Madison's concern about
threats to liberty: review by an independent judiciary. Fortified by
the "permanency in office"6 1 and insulation from political pressure
that lifetime tenure provides, the federal courts could use their
faculty of sound "judgment"6 2 to promote the "moderation" needed
in a republic.6 3 That mix of checks and balances is important in
immigration law, despite the integral role in immigration of
sovereignty and exigency. To further that mix of checks and
balances, immigration requires a system of shared stewardship
among the branches.
B. The Supreme Court Takes a Turn
As an example, consider the Supreme Court's decision in INS
v. Chadha.6 4 In Chadha, the Court struck down an immigration
provision that permitted Congress to use the so-called legislative
veto. Under the legislation that the Court invalidated, one house of
Congress by majority vote could void decisions by the Department
of Justice that granted individual noncitizens a lawful status.6 5 111
57. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 36, at 322.
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 15, at 257-58.
59. TE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 469.
60. See id. at 470 (noting that the scruples embodied by an independent
judiciary "operate[] as a check upon the legislative body" by imposing "obstacles to
the success of an iniquitous intention" and thereby "mitigating the severity" of
"unjust and partial laws").
61. Id. at 466.
62. Id. at 469.
63. See id. at 466, 469-70.
64. 462 U.S. 917, 956-59 (1983).
65. Id. at 925 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 244(c)(2)).
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holding that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, the Court
stressed that this scheme violated the Constitution's presentment
requirement, which mandated that legislation be signed by the
President and subject to presidential veto.66 Exploring the reasons for
requiring joint action by Congress and the executive branch, the
Court cited Hamilton's elaboration of the stewardship rationale in
Federalist No. 73.67 Hamilton defended presentment to the President
as promoting "due deliberation" in the enactment of statutes.68
According to Hamilton, the President's election by the entire country
would reduce the influence on the chief executive of the locally
instilled "spirit of faction" that can distort the legislative process.69
By introducing the President-a player without local bias-into the
legislative mix, the Framers sought to "increase the chances in favor
of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design."7 0
The Court's decision in Chadha acknowledges the risks
inherent in legislative action on immigration.7 1 Second-guessing
administrative decisions by a one-house majority could be biased or
hasty, per the Framers' fear. Judicial review curbing the one-house
veto of administrative action was an act of stewardship to temper the
ill effects that the Framers had sought to prevent.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Chadha stressed the
stewardship rationale. Justice Powell suggested that the one-house
veto, by making it easier for Congress to target individuals whom
Congress didn't like, violated the Bill of Attainder Clause.72
Describing the haste of Congress's action in Chadha's case, Justice
66. See id. at 946-47, 958.
67. Id. at 947.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
69. Id.
70. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-48 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra
note 68, at 458). Construing the Framers' vision, Joseph Story, a Justice of the
Supreme Court and the foremost constitutional scholar of the early nineteenth
century, observed that
[p]ublic bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the
dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and
impetuous. . . . [A] legislature] . . . rarely has the firmness to insist upon
holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it
in all its bearings and relations on society.
Id. at 949-50 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 383-
84 (1859)).
71. Id. at 958-59.
72. Id. at 961-63, 965-66 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Powell noted that the measure's House sponsors had not even
distributed the text of the resolution to the entire House membership
because of time pressure.73 For Justice Powell this jettisoning of
"normal procedures" increased the risk of "arbitrary and ill-
considered action."7 4 The Chadha majority expressed concern that
once such impulses infiltrated the legislative process, proponents of
"oppressive" laws would have the upper hand." Thwarting this
ominous trend toward oppressive "efficiency"7 6 was vital for the
vulnerable immigrants that Congress might have targeted in the
measure that the Chadha Court struck down. In addition, the ease of
second-guessing progressive executive decisions could have injured
citizens and lawful residents. Invalidating the law spared citizens and
lawful residents from those dire consequences.
1. Stewardship and Levels ofReview
Judicial review under the shared stewardship model often
entails a key threshold inquiry: determining the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny." As in equal protection, probing judicial review
requires that the political branches show a close nexus between ends
and means." For example, in adjudicating classifications based on
gender, the Court has required that measures be substantially related
to achievement of an important governmental objective." However,
in other settings, the Court has been far more deferential, settling for
a looser connection between government's goals and the measures
the political branches have chosen to achieve those ends."
Determining the level of judicial review is crucial for all
stakeholders in immigration cases. If review is too searching, the
political branches will be subject to persistent judicial second-
guessing. That paralyzes policymakers and effectively neutralizes the
73. Id. at 964 n.6.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 947.
76. Id. at 959.
77. Choosing a standard of review was not necessary in Chadha, in which
the Court merely asked if the legislative veto provisions at issue violated the
presentment requirement and other constraints on Congress's authority under Article
I. Id. at 944.
78. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017).
79. Id.
80. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(outlining "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard).
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virtues of decisiveness and dispatch that Hamilton identified." On
the other hand, unduly lax judicial review will encourage excess and
abuse by the political branches that Hamilton branded as inculcating
a toxic "spirit of injustice."8 2 A recurring difficulty in immigration
jurisprudence is the Court's inability to coherently explain when and
why a particular level of judicial review applies to actions by the
political branches.
The tension between the competing risks of overly intrusive
judicial review and unduly deferential judicial review reflects
shifting conceptions of the deliberation that courts should expect of
the political branches.8 3 The fit between ends and means is a
hallmark of deliberation. The Framers were familiar with Aristotle
and other sources of classical wisdom.8 4 Aristotle viewed
deliberation as linked to practical judgment." Enlarging on this
81. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Court took this view in a different context
involving remedies for allegedly inappropriate detention of Muslim immigrants after
9/11. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2017). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
announced a restrictive test for when the Court would entertain suits for damages
directly under the Constitution, as it did for law enforcement search and seizure
excesses in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1851, 1865. Justifying this restrictive test,
Justice Kennedy warned a looser test for recognizing suits for damages against
officials in national security cases might "cause an official to second-guess difficult
but necessary decisions." Id. at 1861; see also Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants:
The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Offi cials for Damages, 1980 SuP.
CT. REV. 281, 282 (noting that undue exposure to suits for damages can lead to
excessive risk aversion by public officials); cf Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96
IOWA L. REV. 195, 202 (2010) (suggesting test for availability of Bivens actions in
national security cases). My point here is not to justify Abbasi, which takes an
unduly crimped view of the availability of suits for damages under the Constitution
as a remedy for official overreaching. See Steve Vladeck, The Incoherence of the
Normative Case Against Bivens, LAWFARE (June 21, 2017, 2:53 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/incoherence-normative-case-against-bivens
[https://perma.cc/QNK3-BYCD]. Rather, I cite Abbasi simply as a recent example
of reasoning on the costs of judicial remedies in an imnigration-related case.
82. TE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
83. Scholars have also been resourceful and inventive in framing these
shifts in structural decisions as a dialectic between rules and standards. See Aziz Z.
Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126
YALE L.J. 346, 349-51 (2016).
84. Cf HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 203 (Penguin ed. 1990)
(discussing the familiarity of the American founding generation with classical
sources).
85. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 152 (Martin Ostwald trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1962) ("[T]he capacity of deliberating well about what is good and
advantageous for oneself is ... typical of ... practical wisdom.").
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notion, Aristotle commented that practical wisdom resides in the
ability to "calculate well with respect to some worthwhile end"86 that
is "attainable . . . by action.""
Hamilton's appreciation of deliberation reflected comparable
premises. In Federalist No. 23, in extolling the virtues of placing the
federal government in charge of the national defense, Hamilton
noted that in any plan for governance, "the means ought to be
proportioned to the end.""" Therefore, much depends on the
closeness of the nexus between ends and means that a court requires.
In this past term, the Supreme Court has endorsed a similar
practical vision for immigration law. In Sessions v. Morales-
Santana,"' the Court struck down a provision of the INA that
imposed a gender-based condition on citizenship acquired at birth by
a child born out of wedlock abroad to a U.S. citizen parent and a
foreign national." The provision that the Court invalidated required
at least five years of physical presence in the United States for U.S.
citizen fathers to pass citizenship to children born abroad, while
requiring only one year of physical presence in the United States for
U.S. citizen mothers to accomplish the same result.91 According to
Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the opinion of the Court, the provision
was infirm because it lacked deliberation's signature nexus between
means and ends. 9 2 If the end that Congress envisioned was ensuring
86. Id. at 152.
87. Id. at 157. Aristotle proposed such rules of deliberation in order to curb
demagogic appeals in ancient Athens, which ironically had as their locus Athenian
courts. See BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND
JUDGMENT 121 (2006) (noting Aristotle's view that the courts were "a forum in
which . .. leaders would stir up the people"). Requiring a close fit between posited
ends and the means proposed to achieve those ends is one way that modern courts
seek to curb contemporary demagogic appeals.
88. TE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 6, at 153.
89. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
90. See id. at 1682, 1698, 1700-01. In such cases, the U.S. citizen parent
might be an individual bom abroad to married U.S. citizen parents or bom in the
United States to one or more parents who subsequently moved abroad. Id. at 1687-
88 (discussing facts); id at 1695 n.18 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012)).
91. See id. at 1686-87. Under the provision relevant to the respondent in
Morales-Santana, who was bom in 1962, Congress required that a U.S. citizen
father accrue ten years of physical presence in the United States, including five years
after age fourteen. Id. at 1687 n.3. Congress subsequently amended the law to
shorten the requirement for fathers to five years, including at least two after age
fourteen. See 8 U.S.C. § 140 1(g) (2012); see also id. § 1409(c) (requiring far shorter
period of presence in the United States for citizen mother).
92. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1690 (noting that to pass constitutional
muster, legislation that "differentiates on the basis of gender must show . . . 'that the
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that a child born abroad was "American in character" and thus
worthy of citizenship,93 requiring a substantial period of U.S.
presence by the parent was a legitimate if somewhat rough measure
of the parent's stake in the child's American identity.94 However,
requiring a substantial period of U.S. presence for a U.S. citizen
father but not a U.S. citizen mother "scarcely serve[s] the posited
end.""
To illustrate this disparity, Justice Ginsburg compared two
hypothetical examples. The first was a U.S. citizen mother who had
been physically present in the United States for the statutory one-
year period at some point prior to her nonmarital child's birth
abroad, but never returned to the United States after her child's birth.
The second example concerns a U.S. citizen father who at the time of
the child's birth abroad is just days short of the substantially longer
statutory presence period required of fathers and then eventually
returns to the United States to raise the child.96 The first child
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth; the second did not. However, as
Justice Ginsburg noted, this "anachronistic" scheme" depends on
one of two attenuated rationales: (1) the premise, so dubious today
that the government did not advance the argument, that "unmarried
men take more time to absorb U.S. values than unmarried women
do,"" or (2) the assumption that while an unwed U.S. citizen father
[challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives"') (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (relying
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in striking down
male-only admission policy at Virginia Military Institute)).
93. Id at 1692 (citation omitted); cf To Revise and Codify the Nationality
Laws of the United States into a Comprehensive Nationality Code: Hearings on H.R.
6127 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong. 43, 431
(1940) (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Adviser, State
Department); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and
the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2134
(2014).
94. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692 (rooting presence requirements in
reasonable congressional desire to ensure that U.S. citizen parent could "counteract
the influence of the alien parent"). While one can argue even about the empirical
soundness of this view, the Mlorales-Santana Court accepted this logic as an across-
the-board rationale for U.S. residency requirements. Id at 1695 (accepting, at least
for purposes of argument, that Congress wished to "serve an interest in ensuring a
connection between the foreign-born nonmarital child and the United States").
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id at 1693.
98. Id at 1695.
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needs more time in the United States to counter the "competing
national influence"" of the foreign national mother, unwed foreign
national fathers "care little about, indeed are strangers to, their
children,"00 thereby requiring far less U.S. presence by U.S. citizen
mothers as a counterweight to foreign influence.01 The Court
believed that this stereotype of the absent unwed father was
inaccurate regarding foreign national fathers, just as it was inaccurate
for unwed U.S. citizen fathers.102 This "[1]ump characterization"103
lacked the "close means-end fit"10 4 required by the Equal Protection
Clause's deliberative ideal.
Another decision from this past term, Maslenjak v. United
States,"o' focused on means-end fit as a device for understanding
legislative intent in an immigration case. The Maslenjak Court
addressed whether the government had to show that a false statement
in the course of a noncitizen's naturalization was "material" in order
to obtain a conviction.106 Justice Kagan, writing for the Court,
analyzed the statutory language prohibiting false statements to
"procure" naturalization."1' According to Justice Kagan, this
language implied a "means-end relation" between the false statement
and attainment of the goal of U.S. citizenship.' Requiring the
government to show such a "means-end relation" ensured that a jury
could not convict a defendant for false statements that were
incidental or irrelevant to obtaining naturalization. For example, an
applicant for naturalization might lie about a past speeding
violation.0 ' Since a speeding violation would not in any case be
dispositive in this context, such a statement would not materially
assist in gaining naturalization. At most, it might buttress the
applicant's vanity or avoid embarrassment.
According to Justice Kagan, it was reasonable to assume that




102. Id at 1693 n.13 (citing studies showing that unwed fathers "assume
responsibility for their children in numbers already large and notably increasing").
103. Id at 1695.
104. Id at 1696.
105. 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (2017).
106. See id at 1932.
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) (2012).
108. See Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1925.
109. See id at 1927.
110. See id. at 1925.
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and means as a predicate for a conviction that could result in jail time
and revocation of naturalization. The Maslenjak Court attributed to
Congress a concern for the close fit of ends and means that Aristotle
and Hamilton saw as integral to deliberation. A more attenuated link
between ends and means would not fit the model of deliberation that
the Maslenjak Court read into the immigration statute.
2. Conflicts and Contradictions in the Current Paradigm
If Morales-Santana and Maslenjak heralded the embrace of
deliberative means-end rationality that characterizes much non-
immigration adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause, the
account of immigration law reflected in these cases from the Court's
October 2016 term might be a tale of triumph for the "normalization"
thesis, which urges the convergence of immigration with mainstream
precedent. However, the convergence story does not explain these
cases. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court in Morales-
Santana, pointedly distinguished the Court's decision on acquired
citizenship from decisions involving Congress's 'exceptionally
broad power' to admit or exclude aliens."." In those more deferential
cases, the Court did not require the familiar means-end fit of
deliberative rationality. However, while the Morales-Santana Court
made clear that convergence is not the order of the day, the Court
was far less clear in articulating the justification for that disparate
treatment.
In Morales-Santana, Justice Ginsburg cited two decisions
supporting the downgrading of the means-end fit test in the
admission of foreign nationals. In Fiallo v. Bell,1 12 the Court, forty
years before Morales-Santana, had upheld a provision, since
amended, that authorized visas for children born abroad out of
wedlock to mothers who were U.S. citizens or LPRs at the time of
the visa application. However, the Court did not make visas available
to similarly situated children of U.S. citizen or LPR fathers.113 The
Fiallo Court justified a less rigorous standard of review with gender-
based generalizations comparable to the "[1]ump characterization"
111. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (citing
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 794 (1977)).
112. See 430 U.S. at 800.
113. See id. at 788-89. The statute had the same impact on visa eligibility for
foreign national fathers of U.S. citizen or LPR children born out of wedlock. Id. at
789.
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that the Court rejected in Morales-Santana.114 In Nguyen v. INS,115
the Court asserted that it was applying the rigorous standard that the
Court subsequently applied in Morales-Santana in upholding the
constitutionality of a provision that required that a U.S. citizen father
acknowledge a child born out of wedlock abroad in order for that
child to be deemed to have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth.116
Justice Ginsburg had joined Justice O'Connor's vigorous dissent in
Nguyen,"' in which the nominal standard of review appeared at first
blush to make little difference; almost a quarter-century after Fiallo,
the Court justified this gender-based disparity with the same gender
stereotypes that Fiallo had cited."
Taken together, Fiallo and Nguyen illustrate Morales-
Santana's lack of a clear justification for distinguishing the acquired
citizenship at issue in Morales-Santana from the admission or
exclusion of foreign nationals at issue in Fiallo. First, consider
Justice Ginsburg's argument that Congress's power over admission
of foreign nationals requires greater deference."' That reasoning is
painfully artificial. It is not at all clear why Congress's power to
determine which foreign-born individuals acquire U.S. citizenship at
birth merits less deference than its power to admit or exclude foreign
nationals. After all, the Court decided in Morales-Santana that
Congress lacked the power to permit a shorter period of physical
presence in the United States for the children of U.S. citizen mothers,
114. Compare id. at 799 (asserting that in excluding fathers Congress was
motivated by the "perceived absence ... of close family ties" between fathers and
children born out of wedlock and with the "serious problems of proof' that "lurk in
paternity determinations"), with Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1695. Whether or
not proving paternity was difficult in 1977, it is clearly straightforward in 2017
because of DNA testing, rendering the "scientific" analysis in Fiallo suspect.
115. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
116. See id. at 59-60. The statute, still part of the INA, does not require an
acknowledgment from a similarly situated U.S. citizen mother. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a)(4)(B) (2012).
117. See 533 U.S. at 74.
118. See id. at 66-67 (asserting that the requirement of paternal
acknowledgment merely ensured that father and child would have the opportunity to
meet and bond, thus replicating the "opportunity, inherent in the event of birth as to
the mother-child relationship"). The Nguyen Court asserted that DNA testing was no
substitute for proof of this parent-child bond, which it viewed as "inherent" for
mothers but not fathers. Id. at 66. But see id. at 74-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(critiquing majority's rationale); see generally Kelly, supra note 22 (criticizing
influence of stereotypes in the acquired citizenship cases).
119. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1697-99.
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as opposed to fathers.1 2 0 That decision had one salient result, at least
prospectively: More children of U.S. citizen mothers born out of
wedlock abroad would, in the absence of further congressional
action, be foreign nationals. Nowhere in Morales-Santana did the
Court even try to describe why Congress's power to admit or exclude
foreign nationals is more worthy of deference than its power to
choose which individuals born abroad could acquire citizenship.
This distinction is particularly puzzling because the Constitution
expressly grants Congress the power to regulate the naturalization of
noncitizens.1 2 1 In contrast, no specific provision in the Constitution
grants Congress the power to regulate noncitizens' entry or
admission. 122
Moreover, the Morales-Santana Court failed to acknowledge
that the mix of citizens and foreign nationals is a zero-sum game. For
immigration and citizenship purposes, there are only two kinds of
people: citizens and foreign nationals. If there are more citizens,
there are fewer foreign nationals to admit or exclude. Conversely, if
there are fewer citizens, as after Morales-Santana, there are more
foreign nationals. If Congress has the power to "admit or exclude"
noncitizens, as Morales-Santana acknowledged, arguably it should
also have the power to increase or decrease the aggregate numbers
of noncitizens by determining which persons born abroad are in fact
U.S. citizens.12 3 In this sense, the Morales-Santana Court's definition
of Congress's power to admit or exclude foreign nationals appears
arbitrary, formalistic, and a questionable predicate for the Court's
distinction between insistence on means-end fit and a more
deferential standard of review.
Matters do not get clearer with consideration of Nguyen's
approach. While the Court purported to apply a less deferential
120. Id. at 1699-1700.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Admittedly, the naturalization of a
foreign national is different from the acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth of a
person born abroad, but the Court has often treated them as springing from the same
source of congressional authority. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 812, 823 (1971). In
any case, these two processes for conferring citizenship are surely closer to each
other than naturalization is to admission or exclusion of foreign nationals.
122. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS To TE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13-14 (1996); Matthew J. Lindsay,
Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal
Immigration Power, 45 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23 (2010); James E. Pfander &
Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic:
Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 386 (2010).
123. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693.
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standard in that case, the Court's reasoning belied that claim. The
Nguyen Court cited, inter alia, "the importance of assuring that a
biological parent-child relationship exists." 24 However, as Justice
O'Connor opined in her Nguyen dissent, these notions were badly
outdated in 2001125 because of the prevalence of DNA testing.
Conducting immigration law as if science were stuck in the 1950s is
not necessary to preserve the design of our immigration laws or react
to exigency in foreign affairs. It is true that the requirement in
Nguyen of "acknowledgment" is less onerous than the U.S. presence
requirement at issue in Morales-Santana.126 However, the Morales-
Santana Court did not justify why that difference in degree was
significant, if both requirements were products of invidious
stereotypes, as Justice Ginsburg clearly believed when she joined
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Nguyen. 1 27 Perhaps the consequences
of the stereotyped judgment matter, but apart from asserting that the
harshness of the consequence made a difference, Justice Ginsburg
devoted little or no space in her opinion for the Court in Morales-
Santana to explaining why that difference was dispositive.
In other words, the decisions of the October 2016 term
demonstrate that distinctions in the degree of deference shown by
courts still matter in immigration law. However, those decisions shed
little light on what drives those distinctions. This lack of guidance is
troubling because of the wide range of contexts in which courts
encounter immigration measures enacted or implemented by the
political branches. Shared stewardship provides a more reliable and
consistent guide.
II. SHARED STEWARDSHIP AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION
MEASURES
Shared stewardship helps a court determine what level of
deliberative rationality it should apply to immigration measures.
124. Nguyenv. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).
125. Id. at 80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing "virtual certainty of a
biological link that modem DNA testing affords").
126. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1694 (describing acknowledgment
requirement as "easily met").
127. See id. at 1693. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Morales-Santana
seemed to support the continued perception of the gender-based acknowledgment
requirement as invidious, given the track record of unwed fathers acknowledging
their children in the United States. See id. at 1693 n.13. If unwed fathers are acting
like responsible parents, there seems to be little basis for presuming them to be
irresponsible when the law makes no such presumption for women. See id.
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Requiring a close means-end relation may result in a measure's
invalidation, as Morales-Santana indicates.12 8 On the other hand,
judicial review that rejects in theory or practice the need for a tight
means-end fit will fortify the measure against legal challenges, as
decisions such as Fiallo and Nguyen show.12 9 Deciding the level of
deliberative rationality that courts should expect entails three factors
with roots in the Framers' thought and in Supreme Court precedent.
Those factors are: (1) the degree of sovereign interest; (2) the extent
of collateral impacts on U.S. persons or entities; and (3) the presence
or absence of intelligible limits on the power of the political
branches. The test is conjunctive; to trigger more searching review, a
challenger of government action would have to demonstrate that all
of the elements are present. I address each in turn.
A. Sovereign Interests: Rhetoric and Reality
Since the Treaty of Westphalia, states have been central players
in international law. To participate in the community of nations,
states must be able to exercise certain sovereign imperatives. As we
shall see below, these imperatives include the power to set criteria
for membership in the national community and that community's
safety and security. These dimensions were understood by the
Framers. Moreover, each facet has figured heavily in the case law,
perhaps even to a fault.13 0
The Framers carefully considered the government's role in
regulating immigration in the new republic. They were aware of the
great international law scholar Emmerich de Vattel's view that
control of immigration was a logical corollary to "rights of domain
and sovereignty." 3 1 As Vattel noted, "The sovereign may forbid the
entrance of his territory either to foreigners in general, or in
particular cases, or to certain persons, or for certain particular
purposes, according as he may think it advantageous to the state."13 2
In Federalist No. 42, Madison vigorously defended the proposal that
Congress regulate naturalization-the process of granting citizenship
128. See id. at 1683-84.
129. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-93 (1977); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at
72-73.
130. See Legomsky, supra note 22, at 263 (arguing that the Supreme Court
has been too deferential).
131. EMER DE VATTEL, TE LAW OF NATIONS 309 (B6la Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008).
132. Id.
26 2018
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty
to persons born abroad who subsequently entered the United
States.133 For Madison, a "uniform rule" for naturalization throughout
the United States was crucial.134 Because citizens enjoyed the
freedom to travel among the states, permitting each jurisdiction to set
its own naturalization rules would be a recipe for chaos.135 While the
Framers' views and early practice on migration control generally are
more muddled,136 Madison's warning on the need for federal
regulation of naturalization demonstrates that the Framers viewed
power over immigration as integral to sovereignty.
In The Chinese Exclusion Case,137 the Supreme Court held that
Congress's power over the admission of foreign nationals to the
United States was a core element of U.S. sovereignty.138 To
demonstrate this point, Justice Field, writing for the Court, alluded to
threats that a more limited conception of sovereignty could not
counter.139 Justice Field invoked an account of stewardship that had
much in common with the Framers' view. According to Field, the
"highest duty of every nation" resided in efforts to "preserve its
independence, and give security against foreign aggression and
encroachment." 40 Field added that the specter of "aggression and
encroachment" could arise both from decisions made by foreign
133. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264-71 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
134. See id. at 267.
135. Id. at 270 (warning that if naturalization were done at the state level, a
state with a need to attract more residents would in effect be able to set
naturalization standards for all the other jurisdictions, requiring grants of citizenship
for persons whose conduct was sufficiently "obnoxious"-perhaps including
commission of crimes-to merit denying naturalization by other states with more
rigorous standards).
136. See generally Pfander & Wardon, supra note 122; Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993).
137. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
138. Id. at 603-04 (observing that the U.S. government's power to "exclude
aliens from its territory" is not open to question and "is an incident of every
independent nation . . . [i]f [a nation] could not exclude aliens it would be to that
extent subject to the control of another power"). Compare Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 127-32
(2002) (critiquing the vision of sovereignty and immigration advanced by Justice
Field, who wrote for the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case), with Martin, supra
note 1, at 35-38 (offering qualified defense of portion of holding dealing with
admission of foreign nationals).
139. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.
140. Id.
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governments, such as attacks on the United States, and by
uncontrolled migration that could consume resources or shift the
agendas of U.S. officials.141 For Field, addressing either threat was
fundamental to sovereignty.
While Justice Field's view of the relationship between
immigration controls and sovereignty is primarily defensive-
reasoning backward from potential threats to the powers necessary to
avert those threats-there is a more positive account of the
relationship between immigration and sovereignty that is rooted in
notions of community and membership. This view, most closely
associated with the contemporary philosopher Michael Walzer,
views a state as an entity that seeks to form and maintain bonds of
belonging among persons who participate in the state's governance
and culture.142 This conception draws on analogies to family,
neighborhood, and voluntary organizations.143 Such bonds do not
necessarily imply that the community must or should be
homogeneous-indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
birthright citizenship,144 including the children of undocumented
immigrants, assures that heterogeneity will be the rule. Moreover,
one could assert that certain criteria for admission of immigrants-
such as those based on gender-are so arbitrary or invidious that
they are inimical to the community's identity. In addition, one can
also argue, despite a long line of Supreme Court cases,145 that once
the state has admitted a foreign national as an immigrant authorized
to permanently and lawfully reside in the United States, it would be
unfair to subject that person to post-admission changes in grounds
for removal from the country.146 That said, most immigration
scholars across the ideological spectrum accept that the admittedly
141. Id. Justice Field's language was more vivid and arguably invidious,
conjuring up images of massive migration from Asia that resonated with pervasive
anti-Asian stereotypes that Justice Field, in his political career, had helped to spawn.
See id. (expressing fear about "vast hordes" of migrants "crowding in upon us"). Cf
Cleveland, supra note 138, at 115-16 (discussing Field's hopes to win the
Presidency and how his immigration stance complemented those ambitions).
142. See WALZER, supra note 8, at 31-64; Cox, supra note 8, at 371-76.
143. See Martin, supra note 25, at 193.
144. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898).
145. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952).
146. See Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties
A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 237, 242 (1983) (noting the argument that
LPRs commit themselves to the U.S. community, thus triggering "mutual
obligations [that] arise because of physical proximity and a sense of sharing in a
common enterprise").
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arbitrary parameters entailed in sovereignty, such as physical
borders, give rise to some authority to select attributes among foreign
nationals applying for admission to that state, including those foreign
nationals who aspire to permanent membership.
In a constitutional republic or democracy in which popular
participation is integral to governance, that authority is even more
important. As Hiroshi Motomura has put it, "[A] democracy must
have the power to shape and preserve itself as a community of
individuals who share interests and values." 4 7 To fulfill those goals,
"a democracy must have the power to grant or refuse membership to
newcomers, as well as the power to say that members can do some
things that nonmembers cannot."l48 The Court's recent affirmation of
Congress's power over the admission of noncitizens 4 9 was surely
informed by this sense that the power to shape a community's future
through such decisions is an important dimension of democratic
governance."o
If such decisions are essential to democratic governance, they
should generally be made by the political branches, which are
majontanan in character and hence closer to the people, compared
with the unelected judiciary. "' If the voters believe that Congress's
choices about admission criteria are unwise-either because they are
147. MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 5.
148. Id.
149. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017).
150. Different factions may have different visions of that community, which
trigger contests in the political arena. For example, some in Congress believe that
family reunification-a prime imperative for U.S. immigration law for decades-is
less important than ensuring that the country has an ample supply of foreign
nationals with skills that are useful for economic development. See Reforming
American Immigration for Strong Employment (RAISE) Act, S. 354, 115th Cong.
§ 4(a)(1)(A) (2017) (proposing elimination of immigrant visas for parents of U.S.
citizens); cf David Nakamura, Trump, GOP Senators Introduce Bill to Slash Legal
Immigration Levels, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/20 17/08/02/trump-gop-senators-to-introduce-bill-to-slash-
legal-immigration-levels/ [https://perma.cc/5G8X-EXCR] (detailing criticism of bill,
which would reduce legal immigration and shift remaining legal immigration away
from family-based visas and toward noncitizens who placed high with scoring
system stressing English proficiency, education levels, andjob skills).
151. Justice Jackson articulated this view in Harisiades. See Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (noting that immigration policy is
"vitally and intricately interwoven with ... the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of govermnent" that it is
"entrusted to the political branches" and "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference"). See also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (reiterating
importance of deference).
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too restrictive or not restrictive enough-the people can make their
own choices at the ballot box. In contrast, because of the federal
judiciary's protections, such as lifetime tenure, the people have no
such leverage over the courts.
Deference is particularly important for what the Court has
called "[p]redictive judgment" 5 2 regarding the probability and
gravity of a risk. In exigent situations, the impact of possible harm
may be grave, time is of the essence, and probability is often difficult
to estimate accurately.153 In such situations, the Executive's ability to
respond with due Hamiltonian "dispatch" 5 4 is vital. For example, in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,"' the Supreme Court upheld an EO
mandating the interdiction of vessels containing Haitians seeking to
travel to the United States after a coup in Haiti precipitated
widespread fear of persecution in that country.1 5 6 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, strongly implied that in exigent situations, the
President's capacity for quick and comprehensive information-
gathering was owed a measure of deference by the courts. For Justice
Stevens, the attempted "mass migration[]" of one country's nationals
to another country5 . without the second country's prior consent was
just such an exigent circumstance.
B. Managing Collateral Impacts
Immigration decisions often affect other individuals, entities,
and institutions beyond the parties to a case.' Since stewardship
152. See Dep't. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
153. See Chesney, supra note 7, at 1380-85.
154. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 7, at 424.
155. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
156. Id. at 163-66, 188.
157. Id. at 187-88; cf id. at 185 (quoting Dutch delegate to conference on the
drafting of the Refugee Convention as asserting, without disagreement from fellow
participants, that Convention did not impose duties on states regarding "attempted
mass migration" flows "across frontiers").
158. See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism,
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321, 330 (2016) (in environmental context, observing that
landowner who destroys wetlands generates negative externalities such as increased
flooding for adjacent landowners; in school financing arena, aggregate effect of
reducing school funding in individual school districts yields negative externalities
for society as a whole in the form of a less educated work force); Jonathan S. Masur
& Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 93, 124-25 (2015)
(noting that bank runs that put pressure on financial system can result from
aggregated impact of individual decisions by short-term lenders to call in short-term
loans; government deposit insurance can ease short-term lenders' concerns and
30 2018
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty
concerns itself with this broader range of stakeholders, collateral
impacts should be central. Moreover, collateral impacts can be
intangible, encompassing harm to reliance interests or the narrowing
of perspectives caused by gender bias. 5
The Supreme Court, as we have already seen, has frequently
cited potential collateral impacts in immigration cases. In Plyler v.
Doe,1 6 0 the Court warned that state laws prohibiting undocumented
children from attending public schools would exacerbate the larger
social problems of crime and unemployment.16 1 Collateral impacts
have also been key in so-called "crimmigration" cases, in which the
Court has analyzed the interaction of the immigration and criminal
justice systems.1 6 2 The Court has enhanced clarity on what criminal
convictions trigger an LPR's deportation. That clarity vindicates
reliance interests and minimizes the adverse effects that uncertainty
would trigger for the functioning of criminal justice. 16 3
prevent bank runs, but can result in different negative externality of "moral hazard"
in which lenders make unduly aggressive loan decisions knowing government will
bail them out because they are too big to fail; and cascade of bad loans leads to
financial crisis).
159. See generally Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
160. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
161. Id at 230. Cf Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012)
(asserting that overzealous enforcement of immigration law by state law
enforcement officials acting without federal guidance may adversely affect U.S.
trade, capital from foreign investors, and revenue from foreign tourism).
162. See Cade, supra note 29, at 1057; see generally Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1683 (2009).
163. See Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017). In Lee, the
Court cited a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment in vacating the defendant's plea to possessing the drug ecstasy with
intent to distribute. The defendant's lawyer had failed to inform the defendant that
plea would lead to removal. Id at 1965. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
noted that "[t]he decision whether to plead guilty also involves assessing the
respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea." Id at 1966. The
petitioner, Chief Justice Roberts observed, viewed avoiding removal as "the
determinative factor." Id at 1967. Since the defendant faced near-certain removal
pursuant to the plea bargain offered by the prosecution, and the defendant therefore
had nothing material to lose, Chief Justice Roberts noted that "common sense," id at
1966, would dictate that such a defendant reject the plea and instead opt to throw a
"Hail Mary" pass at trial. Id at 1967. Vacating Lee's plea vindicated his reliance
interest in receiving competent legal advice on the consequences of a plea deal. Id
at 1962.
Encouraging defense lawyers' diligence on immigration consequences
serves the interests of efficient criminal justice adjudication by maximizing the
chances for a defense attorney to bargain successfully with the prosecution for a plea
that avoids the defendant's removal. Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373
3 1
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Immigration actions that injure reliance interests can also have
negative collateral impacts. Concern with reliance interests is as old
as the Framers. Hamilton wrote of the corrosive effect on individual
initiative of government measures that reflected a "spirit of
injustice." 6 4 In a prescient discussion, Hamilton warned that
impinging on reliance interests for short-term gain can have grave
long-term effects.16 5 Hamilton posited an ideal-the "[c]onsiderate"
person,1 6 6-who understands that while a shortsighted government
policy may make her "a gainer today," the same individual may by
"tomorrow [be] the victim of a spirit of injustice." 6 7 That volatility
has spillover effects for the entire polity. As Hamilton remarked, the
"inevitable tendency of . . . a spirit [of injustice] is to sap the
foundations of public and private confidence and . . . introduce in its
stead universal distrust and distress." 6 8 The moderating "temper" of
(2010) (observing that stakeholders' knowledge of immigration consequences of
pleas may promote "agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties");
Cade, supra note 29, at 1057 (noting that the Court has "encourag[ed] actors in ...
criminal proceedings to evaluate the potential immigration consequences in their
framing of charges, pleas, and sentences"). From this perspective, the approach in
Lee will reduce adjudication costs over the long haul, thus minimizing the adverse
impact of removal grounds on the administration of criminal justice. Cf Esquivel-
Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017) (noting that the Court employs a
"categorical approach" to assess whether criminal convictions render a noncitizen
removable; looking to the necessary elements of the crime under the governing
statute rather than at "specific facts underlying the crime" promotes certainty,
predictability, and uniformity, rather than relegating defendants to guesswork).
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
165. Hamilton's discussion does not single out concern about reliance
interests. However, the status of reliance interests, including those of good-faith
holders of title to land pursuant to the treaty with Britain that ended the
Revolutionary War, was a salient issue in a celebrated case that Hamilton
successfully litigated in New York prior to the Constitution's enactment that
presaged the advent of judicial review after the Constitution's ratification. See
Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 392, 393 (Julius Goebel,
Jr. ed., 1964); cf Daniel M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932, 963-66 (2010) (discussing significance of
Rutgers v. Waddington for judicial review in the United States); Peter Margulies,
Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material
Support and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1, 18-19 (2013) (same).
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the courtsl69 is therefore a crucial element in maintaining
stewardship.
Early immigration cases demonstrated a keen appreciation for
Hamilton's insight. In Chew Heong v. United States,170 the Supreme
Court construed a restrictive immigration statute targeting Chinese
lawfully residing in the United States as operating prospectively."'
Echoing an approach pioneered by Hamilton in the pre-Constitution
case, Rutgers v. Waddington,1 7 2 the elder Justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, cited the U.S. treaty with China ratified prior to the
statute. 17 3 That treaty permitted Chinese nationals lawfully working
in the United States to travel to China and then return to the United
States "at their pleasure."1 74 Although the Court had already
recognized that Congress can legislate inconsistently with treaty
obligations when it states its intent clearly, Harlan found the statute
unclear and therefore read it as being consistent with the "inviolable
fidelity" owed treaties under international law.17 ' In arriving at this
interpretation, Harlan rejected a contrary reading of the statute that
would have excluded Chinese laborers who had left the United States
temporarily pursuant to the treaty and then sought readmission
without a certificate that Congress had subsequently required of
returning Chinese laborers.
According to Harlan, retroactive application of the certificate
requirement would have violated not only the United States' treaty
with China, but also canons of construction disfavoring retroactivity.
As Justice Harlan explained, to prevent unfair surprise, protect
reliance interests, and ensure that "rights previously vested are [not]
injuriously affected," courts will require a clear statement that
Congress wishes to give a statute affecting such rights retroactive
effect. 176 Taking this view, Justice Harlan reiterated, guarded against
the violation of "previously acquired rights"17 7 and all the ills that the
Framers ascribed to that breach of trust.
169. Id.
170. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
171. Id. at 538.
172. See TE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 165, at
392.
173. Id. at 393.
174. See Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 550.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 559.
177. Id. at 560.
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In analyzing statutes in which Congress clearly stated its intent
to require retroactive application, the Court has unfortunately not
followed Chew Heong v. United States. Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly stated since shortly after Chew Heong was decided that
deportation is not a criminal punishment and the Constitution's Ex
Post Facto Clause therefore did not apply to removal grounds
enacted into law after an act of a noncitizen that triggered
removability under the new law."' In this line of cases, the Court has
failed to heed Hamilton's warning about the corrosive impact of the
"spirit of injustice" caused by oppressive legislation."' This Article
will argue that the Due Process Clause should be read as barring
such statutes."so However, while the Court has declined to read the
Constitution as forbidding retroactive application of removal
grounds, in statutory interpretation it has nonetheless followed Chew
Heong and consistently read ambiguous statutes as purely
prospective in application.181
In these statutory cases, the Court has continued to
acknowledge the concerns that Hamilton articulated about unfair
legislation. In INS v. St. Cyr,1 82 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court,
explained that the presumption against retroactivity is rooted in
"[e]lementary considerations of fairness [that] dictate that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly."1 8 3 In noting the "timeless and universal
human appeal" 18 4 of this notion, Justice Stevens observed that
retroactive legislation had two serious collateral impacts. First,
implicitly echoing Hamilton's concern about the "ill humors" that
178. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952).
179. TE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
180. See infra notes 401-26 and accompanying text.
181. See Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012); cf Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1898-99, 1908 (2000)
(explaining political and legal dynamics of harsh immiigration laws and suggesting
appropriate judicial responses); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 153-54
(1998) (arguing that the Constitution forbids retroactive application); see generally
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549-50
(1990) (arguing that courts have relied on statutory interpretation to smooth hard
edges of plenary power doctrine).
182. See 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
183. Id. at 316 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
184. Id. (quoting Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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can drive pernicious legislation1 5 and Chadha's concern with the
wages of legislative haste,186 Justice Stevens cautioned that
retroactive legislation could be a "means of retribution against
unpopular groups or individuals.""' Moreover, Justice Stevens
added, retroactive legislation deprives people of "confidence about
the legal consequences of their actions."' Just as Hamilton
predicted that unfair laws would "sap the foundations of public and
private confidence,""' the Court warned that retroactive application
would cut against the grain of a "free, dynamic society"o and
suppress "creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors."19
Vigilance regarding similar collateral impacts is a vital component of
shared stewardship.
C. Intelligible Limits: Self-Imposed Controls by the Political
Branches
Shared stewardship also considers whether the political
branches have provided intelligible limits to their assertions of
power. Courts distrust a government position that fails to indicate
clear limits.192 On the other hand, a diligent attempt by government
to limit its own power can mark a particular unit in government as a
good steward that does not require judicial assistance.
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
186. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983).
187. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315; cf id. at 315 n.39 (citing Stephen H.
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)) (discussing noncitizens'
inability to vote and resulting lack of political power to contravene this tendency).
188. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 265-66 (1994)).
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 15, at 470.
190. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgraf 511 U.S. at 265-66).
191. Id.
192. This search for articulable limits is a ubiquitous aspect of judicial
reasoning. Cf RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38
(2001) (discussing judicial focus on practical implementation of constitutional
norms and values); Chesney, supra note 7, at 1362-64 (explaining the need for
articulable and manageable rules); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1274, 1291-92 (2006)
(discussing how the Court shapes doctrine to ensure that it can apply manageable
standards to evaluate government action); see generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing
importance of viewing separation of powers disputes in light of Framers' plan for a
"workable government").
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The Framers stressed the importance of articulable limits on
government. Madison's structural focus on ensuring that "ambition
... [would] counteract ambition" between the branches 93 is but the
most celebrated example. Hamilton's praise for judicial review as
obliging a hasty or iniquitous legislator to "qualify"-i.e., limit-
efforts to pass unjust lawsl9 4 is in much the same vein.
This search for intelligible limits has been crucial to the
Supreme Court's approval of measures in regarding national
security. For example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,"' the
Court noted, in the course of upholding a statute that barred material
support of foreign terrorist groups, that Congress had to some degree
tailored the statute to First Amendment concerns, by not including
domestic groups.19 6 Furthermore, Congress only prohibited aid to the
group, not more generic activity designed for public consumption,
such as journalism, scholarship, or human rights monitoring, which
might have conferred an occasional incidental benefit on a DFTO.
Similarly, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith),98
in the course of holding that warrantless wiretapping of alleged
domestic national security threats violated the Fourth Amendment,
the Court suggested in dicta that its reasoning only applied to the
domestic realm; the Court declined to opine on the role of the Fourth
Amendment in surveillance of purely foreign individuals or
entities.' 99 In the Article III cases, the Court has assessed the
constitutionality of certain non-Article III tribunals established by
Congress that lacked the safeguards of federal courts, such as
lifetime tenure. The Court has been far more likely to uphold
193. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 36, at 322.
194. TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 15, at 471.
195. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
196. Id. at 35 (noting that the statute at issue applied only to "foreign terrorist
organizations" and that a "limited number" of such groups are designated as such by
the Executive Branch pursuant to the statute).
197. Id. at 31-33, 36-40.
198. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
199. Id. at 321-22 (stressing that the Court's holding "involves only the
domestic aspects of national security," not the "activities of foreign powers or their
agents"); id. at 322 n.20 (citing sources suggesting that warrantless surveillance
might be permissible in latter case); cf Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United
States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287, 300-01 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A.
Bradley eds., 2009) (noting that Justice Powell, who wrote the Court's opinion in
Keith, had served on an American Bar Association committee that issued a report
that Justice Powell cited for the proposition that warrantless wiretapping was
permissible with respect to foreign powers).
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Congress's handiwork when those tribunals operated only in cabined
areas, such as territorial courts, courts martial, or the efficient
resolution of financial matters that the federal government could
plainly regulate.200
In the immigration realm, a similar impulse has long been
influential. In an early case, Wong Wing v. United States,201 the Court
held that the imprisonment at hard labor for up to one year of a
Chinese national not lawfully entitled to reside in the country was
impermissible without an indictment by a grand jury and a judicial
trial.202 i so holding, the Court rejected the government's argument
that both the offense designated by Congress and the sentence
prescribed in the statute were analogous to vagrancy offenses, which
at that time did not require the safeguards described above.203 The
Court rejected this analogy as not providing sufficient limits on the
political branches' power, just as the Court rejected the analogy to
temporary detention pending adjudication of a foreign national's
removability.204 While detention for this limited purpose was
appropriate,205 the Court in Wong Wing rejected detention with a
punitive purpose imposed after a finding of removability. The
inability to cabin such a claimed power was a substantial factor in
the Court's reasoning.206
200. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comn'nv. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
855-56 (1986) (noting narrow spectrum of claims that agency, in place of state or
federal court, could adjudicate); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973)
(holding that Congress could create non-Article III courts in the District of
Columbia to adjudicate "strictly local" issues, but suggesting in dicta that the
outcome would have been different if Congress had sought to create non-Article III
courts to adjudicate matters of "constitutional and . . . general concem"); Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962) (discussing Chief Justice John
Marshall's justification for permitting non-Article III territorial courts); cf Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493-94 (2011) (citing forum's lack of limits in invalidating
provision of bankruptcy law that permitted non-Article III tribunal to hear tort
claims).
201. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
202. Id. at 238.
203. Id. at 234, 238.
204. Id. at 235-36.
205. Temporary detention prior to adjudication was merely an incident of
removal proceedings, akin to holding certain criminal defendants without bail if a
court determined that they presented a flight risk. See id. at 235. Such a remedy
merely ensured that the proceeding would be completed, and prevented the subject
of the proceeding from undermining the purpose of the proceeding by fleeing the
jurisdiction.
206. Cf United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957) (ruling that
power to question a foreign national subsequent to entry of final order of removal
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In a more recent decision, Zadvydas v. Davis,207 the Court cited
the absence of limits in setting the maximum period that the
government could detain a noncitizen who was already subject to a
final order of removal.208 The Zadvydas Court, in an opinion by
Justice Breyer, found that the government lacked the power to detain
noncitizens in this posture for longer than six months. According to
Justice Breyer, that window of time was the maximum time the
Constitution permitted for the government to show that the actual
physical removal of the noncitizen was reasonably likely, given
countervailing factors such as the refusal of the noncitizen's country
of origin to agree to his or her return. 209 Justice Breyer rejected the
government's argument that neither the INA nor the Constitution
imposed a limit on post-final order detention.210 He asserted that
accepting this argument would amount to sanctioning "indefinite"
detention and thus would raise substantial questions of
constitutionality.211
D. Summary
In sum, shared stewardship hinges more searching review on
whether the political branches have shown themselves to be fit
stewards in the immigration realm. That inquiry does not depend on
the policy merits of a challenged measure, or on precise accounting
was limited to questions regarding the noncitizen's readiness to appear for execution
of the removal order and did not extend to free-floating questions about the
noncitizen's associations and relationships).
207. 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001).
208. Id at 701-02.
209. Id at 689.
210. Id at 690.
211. Id at 689. Justice Breyer also noted that the govermnent's proposed
construction of the statute authorizing post-final order detention was not limited to
certain classes of noncitizens, such as "suspected terrorists," but instead applied to
any noncitizen "ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist
visa violations." Id at 691. In addition, the Court noted that under the govermnent's
reading the noncitizen could seek relief against excessive detention only in
administrative proceedings, which were not subject to "significant . . . judicial
review." Id at 692. These multiple failures to impose limits helped persuade the
Court that the govermnent's position was not consistent with the statute or the
Constitution. Cf Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (asserting that mandatory detention of an LPR pending adjudication of
removability due to criminal convictions was appropriate because the detention
would typically be for a reasonable period bounded by issuance of a final order of
removal, but leaving open the legality of protracted detention caused by
"unreasonable delay" on govermnent's part).
38 2018
Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty
of the measure's ultimate means-end fit. Rather, the model asks
whether the challenged measure demonstrates that the political
branches have acted with the heedful perspective on governance that
the Framers envisioned. The indicia of sovereign interest, collateral
impacts, and intelligible limits provide signposts in that key inquiry.
To ensure that judicial review is not unduly intrusive, the test is
conjunctive; the challenger will have to show that each element cuts
against the claims of adequate stewardship made by the political
branches. If the challenger can show each element, the degree of
means-end fit required will be such that virtually any measure will
fail the test. However, if the challenger cannot show each element,
the looser fit required will, in the multi-variable realm of
immigration law, almost always lead to upholding the measure
challenged. The best test for the model itself is its work in practice.
III. APPLYING THE SHARED STEWARDSHIP MODEL
A model is only as good as the justification it provides in the
real-world arena of longstanding problems encountered by the
courts. This Part applies the shared stewardship model to four
important issues in immigration law: gender-based criteria in
admission and citizenship; vetting of visa applicants by consular
officials; presidential power over immigration; and retroactive
application of grounds for removal. I discuss each in turn.
A. Gender-Based Criteria
The Court's decision this term in Sessions v. Morales-Santana
struck down a gender-based statutory provision on acquired
citizenship that had become increasingly difficult to justify.
However, the Court's rationale for distinguishing the measure
invalidated in Morales-Santana from other gender-based measures
that the Court had previously upheld was short on persuasive force
and normative coherence. The shared stewardship model seeks to
remedy that deficit.
First, the model would straightforwardly acknowledge that the
sovereign interest of the United States in such distinctions is low. As
Justice Ginsburg eloquently noted in Morales-Santana, the Court has
repeatedly and with good reason expressed skepticism about gender
distinctions in almost every other sphere of American law.212 None
212. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2017).
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cope with exigent circumstances or contribute in an appreciable way
to a vision of membership in the national community that is anything
more than arbitrary. The presence of gender-based distinctions in any
nook or cranny of immigration and citizenship law is at best an
awkward anachronism, and at worst an ongoing reproach that the
court and the political branches are not doing their jobs in a
constitutional republic.
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg lucidly explained in Morales-
Santana, gender-based distinctions have adverse collateral effects
that are severe, albeit intangible in character. For example, Justice
Ginsburg recognized that "[o]verbroad generalizations . . . have a
constraining impact."2 13 In purporting to distinguish between the
respective predispositions of men and women toward nurturing the
young, rules embodying such stereotypes may "create a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to
assume the role of primary family caregiver. "214 These rules also
send a constraining signal to men who hope to transcend stereotypes
through the "exercise [of] responsibility for raising their children."2 1 5
Ensconced in the august provinces of the U.S. Code, such provisions
send an inauspicious message about gender equality, independent of
their impact on the parties.
The criterion that makes the difference for the level of means-
end fit required is the presence of intelligible limits. Justice Ginsburg
was correct in Morales-Santana to describe the parental
acknowledgment requirement upheld by the Court in Nguyen as
"minimal"2 1 6 and "easily met."2 17 Viewed from an ex ante
perspective, fathers who wish to ensure that their children can be
deemed to have acquired U.S. citizenship at birth need only provide
a sworn writing acknowledging paternity before the child reaches the
age of eighteen.2 1 8 While not everyone potentially affected by this
provision has read it or is knowledgeable about its content, ignorance
of the law may extend to any provision of the U.S. Code. In
providing for the simple expedient of a sworn acknowledgment and
allowing the better part of twenty years after the child's birth to
fulfill this criterion, Congress has shown a willingness to operate
213. Id. at 1692-93.





218. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)(B) (2012).
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under intelligible limits that demonstrates adequate stewardship.
Viewed under the less demanding standard that the Court applied in
practice in Nguyen, the provision passes muster. The more onerous
requirement of years spent in the United States in Morales-Santana
showed no similar sense of limits and thus merited the more
searching scrutiny that the Court employed.
A lack of limits also marked the since-repealed exclusion from
visa preferences of children born out of wedlock to U.S. citizen or
LPR fathers. At the time that the Court decided Fiallo v. Bell, the
INA included severe restrictions on the admission of most
individuals who were not considered "Immediate Relatives"-
spouses, "children," and certain parents-of U.S. citizens or LPRs.219
Other relatives would be subject to onerous quota limits that entailed
lengthy waits.220 To get a sense of the multi-year waits in store for
persons not in the Immediate Relative category, consider the current
situation of offspring over twenty-one years of age, whom the INA
refers to as "unmarried sons [or] daughters."221 The priorities for
admission of this group reflect Congress's view that reunification of
adult children with U.S. citizen or LPR parents is less pressing than
reunification of minor children with their parents.222 The respective
waits for an unmarried son or daughter of a citizen223 or LPR224 are
substantial: Under current conditions, the wait will be a minimum of
almost seven years, and a maximum of over twenty years.225 Those
219. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 789-90 (1977).
220. Id. The INA also required adult relatives not included in the Immediate
Relative category to undergo labor certification-a lengthy and selective process
that determines whether a noncitizen abroad has distinctive job skills that will assist
U.S. employers while not displacing U.S. workers. Id. To get a sense of the multi-
year waits in store for persons not in the Immediate Relative category, consider the
current situation of offspring over twenty-one years of age, whom the INA refers to
as the "unmarried sons or daughters" of citizens, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (2012), or
LPRs, § 1153(a)(2)(B).
221. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2014)
(discussing this category in the INA).
222. Id.
223. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1).
224. Id. § 1153(a)(2)(B).
225. See Visa Bulletin for July 2017, 10 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 2,
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin July2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4AH-UTY5] (listing visa applications that are now considered
"current" from most countries for entry into the United States as those filed in either
December 2010 (for unmarried sons or daughters of U.S. citizens) or November
2010 (for unmarried sons or daughters of LPRs); for Mexico, a high-immigration
country, the wait is much longer (January 1996 for the unmarried sons or daughters
of citizens)).
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waits are too protracted to qualify as intelligible limits. The provision
upheld in Fiallo demonstrates a degree of heedlessness unworthy of
the fit steward.226 That concern, not the longstanding but mechanical
distinction between acquisition of citizenship at birth and admission
of noncitizens cited by the Morales-Santana Court, should have
prevailed in Fiallo.
B. "Extreme Vetting": The Reviewability of Consular Decisions
While Congress generally sets criteria for the admission or
exclusion of foreign nationals, the State Department's overseas
consular officers determine whether individual noncitizens fit within
these criteria.227 The "extreme vetting" that President Trump has
indicated will follow and supplement his Executive Orders would
occur at the consular level. A shared stewardship approach would
require a closer means-end fit for some consular processing
procedures, including those that U.S. officials implement as part of
the Trump Administration's "extreme vetting."
Legislation, case law, and practical necessity have coalesced to
cede a substantial measure of discretion to U.S. consular officers
processing noncitizens' visa applications. Even though Congress
mandated in 1965 that no person should be "discriminated against"228
regarding issuance of an immigrant visa, Congress subsequently
explained that nothing in the nondiscrimination provision would
restrict the Secretary of State's authority over procedures applicable
to visa processing.22 9 As recently as 2015, a concurring opinion by
Justice Kennedy reiterated that in this area, Congress had "assigned
discretion to the Executive."230
The practicalities of visa processing make some form of
deference inevitable. U.S. consular officials process millions of visa
applications every year.231 In the course of this demanding endeavor,
U.S. officials determine whether foreign nationals qualify for family-
226. Under the law in place at the time Fiallo v. Bell was decided, the only
way to avoid similar protracted waits was for the citizen or LPR father to marry a
citizen or LPR and persuade his spouse to petition for his son or daughter as a
"stepchild." See Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
227. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
229. Id. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
230. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972)).
231. Cf Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2197-99 (2014)
(discussing procedure for processing certain family-based immiigrant visas).
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based immigrant visas, based on claimed relationships with close
U.S. relatives; immigrant employment visas, based on a foreign
national's skill and ability to fill a market niche in the United States
without displacing U.S. workers;2 32 and nonimmigrant student and
tourist visas. In addition, U.S. consular officials must determine
whether a visa applicant is inadmissible for one or more of a plethora
of grounds listed in the INA, including health factors, public safety,
and national security.233 An unduly low threshold for judicial review
of consular officials' work would inhibit timely visa processing and
exponentially increase the workload of the federal courts. 2 34
All that said, the Supreme Court has recently opened the door a
crack on reviewing visa processing; the shared stewardship approach
would open the door wider, although only in reviewing procedures to
ensure basic fairness. In Kerry v. Din, the concurrence opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy assumed without deciding the issue that
a U.S. citizen had an interest cognizable under the Due Process
Clause in the fair and accurate processing of her Immediate Relative
petition for her spouse.2 35 A U.S. consulate in Pakistan had denied
her petition, citing the INA provision excluding persons who have
engaged in "terrorist activities."2 36 However, the consulate gave no
further explanation2 37 of the facts supporting the denial or even of the
specific statutory subsection among the ten included in the provision,
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b).
233. Id. § 1182.
234. Cf Morfin v. Tillerson, 851 F.3d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that
"for more than a hundred years courts have treated visa decisions as discretionary
and not subject to judicial review for substantial evidence and related doctrines of
administrative law").
235. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Alito.
Having assumed that due process applied, Justice Kennedy then found that the
government had already provided due process to the noncitizen. Id at 2141. Justice
Kennedy thus concurred in the result reached in Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia had found that due process
did not apply at all because within the framework of immigration law, in which
Congress had plenary power over admission of noncitizens, the U.S. citizen sponsor
had no cognizable liberty interest in association with her noncitizen spouse. Id. at
2134-36. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor,
dissented. The four dissenting Justices would have held both that the U.S. citizen
sponsor had a cognizable liberty interest and that the government had failed to
provide Din with the process she should have received. Id. at 2141-42.
236. Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)).
237. Id.
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which with applicable cross-references include "dozens" of possible
reasons. 238
In determining that the consulate's failure to give more specific
reasons did not violate due process (even assuming due process was
applicable), Justice Kennedy applied the test that the Supreme Court
had articulated in the 1972 case of Kleindienst v. Mandel 239 regarding
a First Amendment challenge to a visa denial: whether the
government had provided a "facially legitimate and bona fide"
justification. 2 40 Determining that the consular decision met this
standard, Justice Kennedy cited the long tradition of deference to
consular decisions, the risk of inappropriate disclosure of U.S.
intelligence sources and methods, and the noncitizen visa applicant's
history of work for the Taliban government in Afghanistan.241 While
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the noncitizen's ministerial work
for the Taliban might well be "insufficient" in itself to support the
visa denial, he asserted that it at least showed a "facial connection to
terrorist activity." 242
A shared stewardship approach would have required more
searching judicial review of the consular office's refusal to provide
more specific reasons for the denial. First, the collateral impact of
this decision on a U.S. citizen was substantial and grievous-the
U.S. citizen sponsor here was deprived of the ability to live in the
United States with her spouse. Moreover, the consulate's refusal to
give reasons lacked an intelligible limiting principle. Consider the
consulate's refusal to provide the U.S. citizen petitioner with the
specific statutory subsection that supported the denial of her
application. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the aggregated
subsections within the "terrorist activity" inadmissibility section
cover a vast waterfront" of conduct.243 The absence of any factual
explanation plus the plethora of acts potentially covered by the
terrorist activity bar conferred vast discretion on the consular officer
and forced the petitioner and her spouse to guess about how to
respond. If due process requires an effective opportunity to counter
238. Id at 2145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
239. 408 U.S. 753, 754 (1972).
240. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id at 2140-41.
242. Id at 2141. The noncitizen had apparently worked as a clerk for the
Taliban government. Id at 2146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243. Id at 2146 (citing, inter alia, Singh v. Wiles, 747 F. Supp. 2d 1223,
1227 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (alleging that noncitizen had engaged in material support
of terrorist organization by offering its members lodging on the floor of a temple)).
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adverse decisions with evidence and argument, the general denial
that Justice Kennedy endorsed substantially reduced this
opportunity.244
Nor would a fuller explanation have impaired Congress's
design or hindered the executive branch's ability to respond to
exigencies abroad. While protection of sources and methods is a
legitimate concern under the INA and in other contexts, the facts of
the case provide little support for Justice Kennedy's conclusion that
a fuller explanation would have revealed sources and methods. The
consulate could have provided a fuller explanation merely by citing
the applicant's work as a clerk for the Taliban and classifying that as
material support of a terrorist group.245 That explanation would at
least have provided the petitioner and the applicant with enough
information to attempt to counter the denial, perhaps by showing that
the applicant had worked for the government before the Taliban took
power and had no other affiliation with them, had done only
ministerial work required of any clerk, and had not known of or
participated in any violent activities. Providing this information
would have enhanced the statute's design by supplying all
stakeholders with clearer information on the architecture of
Congress's choices.246
Moreover, providing more information to visa applicants about
reasons for a denial can also enhance responses to exigent situations
abroad. In Din or similar cases, incorrect information may have
244. Id. at 2144-45.
245. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012) (defining specific acts that
constitute engaging in terrorist activity).
246. Justice Kennedy noted that Congress had expressly exempted visa
denials based on terrorism or national security concerns from a requirement that the
government provide a visa applicant with the relevant specific provisions on
inadmissibility. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3)). However, this provision does not mandate that the
government withhold such information; it merely states that the general default
disclosure requirement does not apply. See § 1182(b)(3). Moreover, even if the
statute required withholding this information, shared stewardship would nonetheless
require disclosure under most circumstances. One can envision situations where
concern for sources and methods would permit nondisclosure of certain information
supporting a visa denial. For example, a rejected visa applicant would not be entitled
to disclosure of the identity of informants who had cooperated with consular
officials. However, the government should have to provide more support than it did
in Din for the claim that mere disclosure of a statutory subsection will out a
government informant. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132 (plurality opinion).
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triggered the denial.2 47 Terrorist watch lists often include significant
errors, with ineffectual procedures for correcting the record. 248 If Visa
processing includes access to such material, "garbage in" may yield
"garbage out." Giving an applicant more information about the basis
for a denial may flush out such mistakes. Maintaining incorrect
information in U.S. government databases can waste officials' time
and effort and distract officials from worthy leads. Reducing those
costs enhances U.S. security.
The above analysis also suggests a concern with vetting
procedures for all countries that the Trump administration put in
place after the issuance of EO-2.249 One worry is that the vetting
procedures will be discriminatory, raising renewed concerns about
compliance with § 1152(a)(1)(A), which bars discrimination. 2 50 A
related concern is that the procedures will be unduly cumbersome
and intrusive. For example, consular officials may be instructed to
put all visa applicants from particular countries into the Security
Advisory Opinion (SAO) process, which entails additional layers of
screening. 251 That alone will add months to visa processing.
Similarly, consular officials might be instructed to ask intrusive
questions about Sharia law, allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, or
knowledge of U.S. history or civics. The former questions, because
247. See Privacy Impact Assessment for the Visa Security Tracking System,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 7 (Aug. 27, 2009),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypia ice vsptsnet.pdf (noting
possibility of inaccurate information) [https://perma.cc/998T-KQPD]. While the
citizen sponsor in Din did not dispute that her spouse had worked for the Taliban as
a clerk, consular officials could have based the denial on other material. See Din,
135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although Justice Kennedy viewed that
fact as a sufficient basis for finding the denial to be bona fide, Justice Kennedy may
have attached undue weight to this single factor. See id.
248. See Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Latif
v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141-43 (D. Or. 2014); Ibrahim v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Irma D. Manta
& Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1326
(2016) (discussing litigation over no-fly lists); Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in
National Security, 129 HARv. L. REV. 1566, 1599 (2016) (discussing problem of
inaccurate information and insufficient opportunity to correct the record); cf
Abdelfattah v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529-31, 536-39 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (describing lawful-resident Plaintiff's suffering of repeated security checks
that may have been prompted by incorrect information in government databases and
holding that Plaintiff could seek relief under U.S. law).
249. See generally EO-2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
251. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing privacy impacts
of SAO process).
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they single out a particular religion to which a majority of a given
state's nationals belong, might well be discriminatory under
§ 1152(a)(1)(A), and might also be the kind of institutionalized
preference for one religion over another that should trigger more
searching scrutiny. 2 5 2
The collateral impact of such visa obstacles on U.S. sponsors is
substantial, since those persons will have to endure additional delays
in being reunited with close relatives. Leeway about procedures
under section 1152(a)(1)(B) should not become a license for
procedures that are discriminatory, intrusive, or unduly dilatory.2 5 3
One way of addressing this would be to require a certification that
the consular official has a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that
seeking an SAO is appropriate. If necessary, a court could consider a
submission of such information in camera. 2 54 Another alternative,
based on the treatment of removal under Zadvydas, would be to
establish a presumptively reasonable period-say six months or 180
days-for the duration of processing.25 5 Beyond this period, a delay
in processing would be considered presumptively not bona fide or
legitimate.
Other aspects of visa processing may also be excessive under
the INA. For example, the Trump Administration has announced that
it will require certain visa applicants to produce substantially more
information in the course of consular processing, including five years
of social media platforms and identifiers ("handles") and fifteen
years of residential addresses and employment records. 2 56 That
period of time seems unduly burdensome and lacks a clear limiting
principle. Many people will not have records that go back that far.
Retrieving all the information required will be difficult, if not
impossible, requiring each visa applicant to become an amateur
detective. Moreover, each piece of information may produce
additional delays, as consular officials scrutinize inconsistencies and
omissions. That process may result in visa processing grinding to a
halt. Such procedures might be appropriate for a targeted subset of a
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
253. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
254. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
255. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
256. Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 2-3,
http://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/amaresource/DS5535.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYD-
BYAV] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018); Carol Morello, Some Visa Applicants Are Asked
for Social-Media Names, WASH. POST, June 2, 2017, at A03.
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given country's nationals, if other information regarding those visa
applicants suggests a heightened risk of terrorist activity. However,
broad-brush application of such procedures could have a substantial
collateral impact, amounting to a de facto cessation in visa
processing.
Broad-brush use of these burdensome procedures would also
not serve U.S. sovereign interests. It would not enhance consular
officials' ability to respond to exigent circumstances beyond the
ability available through more tailored inquiries. Moreover,
unchecked vetting would also upset the carefully wrought design of
the INA, triggering § 1152(a)(1)(A), the INA's nondiscrimination
provision.2 5 7 Under a shared stewardship model, courts should
require that the Executive demonstrate a closer means-end fit for
"extreme vetting" of this type.
C. Executive Orders and Actions on Immigration
As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged,2 5 8 courts have
often accorded a measure of deference to the Executive regarding
national security and foreign affairs .259 In the immigration context,
courts have generally displayed deference both when construing a
statutory delegation to the President26 0 and in considering the
interaction of executive action and constitutional norms. 261 yet,
judicial deference has never been absolute.2 6 2 Because of its clash
257. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
258. See Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). The Court fashioned
its stay of President Trump's second travel ban inIRAP after appellate courts largely
upheld the injunctions entered below. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th
Cir. 2017); IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017); cf Hawaiiv. Trump,
No. 17-17168, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 26513, at *13-14 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017)
(invalidating EO-3 as contrary to INA).
259. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088 (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010)) (noting that "[t]he interest in preserving national security is
'an urgent objective of the highest order"'); id. at 2089 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 307 (1981)) (noting that in context of equitable balancing required for stay
of decision below regarding the admission of refugees with no previous ties to the
United States, "the balance tips in favor of the Government's compelling need to
provide for the Nation's security").
260. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158 (1993).
261. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-70 (1972).
262. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (holding that
executive branch could not detain noncitizens subject to final orders of removal
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with the text, structure, and purpose of the INA, deference is
inappropriate for EO-3, the indefinite ban announced by President
Trump in September 2017 on entry of most immigrants and certain
nonimmigrants from specific countries.263
1. President Trump's Measures Regarding Entry ofForeign
Nationals: Factual Background
In 2017, President Trump took three distinct actions regarding
entry of foreign nationals. He issued an EO in January (EO-1), a
revised EO (EO-2) in March, and a Proclamation in September (EO-
3).264 The first EOs were temporary, while EO-3 is indefinite in
duration, subject to internal review every 180 days. 265 As we shall
see, the indefinite character of EO-3 tips it over the edge into conflict
with the INA. Before explaining that conclusion, it will be useful to
set out the factual background of each of the three measures and-by
way of contrast-briefly discuss the legal merits of now-expired EO-
2.
In late January 2017, President Trump issued EO-1,
temporarily suspending entry of foreign nationals from seven
countries-Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen-
and all persons granted refugee status abroad. 266 The EO suspended
entry for the seven-country nationals for ninety days, and entry of
refugees for 120 days. 267 The original order encompassed current
visa-holders (VHs), such as doctors or students returning from
holiday break abroad. 268 The order also did not expressly exempt
returning LPRs. 26 9 As a result, airports became sites of chaos, as VHs
and others were detained and in some cases summarily removed
when there was no reasonable prospect of physically returning those individuals to
their country of origin).
263. See EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
264. See generally Exec. Order 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter EO-1]; EO-2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg.
45,161.
265. See EO-1, § 3, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,978; EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. at 13,212
(Mar. 6, 2017); EO-3, § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,169.
266. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
267. Id.
268. See Washingtonv. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2017).
269. See id. at 1165 (finding that the EO did not expressly exempt LPRs and
that subsequent statements by White House Counsel disclaiming intent to include
LPRs did not bind the Executive).
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despite lawful commitments in the United States, such as enrollment
in colleges and service at U.S. hospitals.270
After the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against EO-1,
President Trump issued EO-2 in early March. EO-2 stated that the
pause in admissions was designed to "improve . . . screening and
vetting protocols," as well as protocols for visa and refugee
processing, 271  and ensure that inadequately screened or vetted
persons did not enter the United States as that review took place. In
addition, the revised EO expressly exempted LPRs and current VHs,
took Iraq off the list of countries whose nationals were affected, and
instituted a waiver program for refugees based on the "national
interest," compliance with international agreements or
understandings, hardship, and other factors.272
After decisions by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that in large
part upheld injunctions entered against the revised EO, the Supreme
Court in June issued a per curiam stay of the injunctions. 273 That stay
exempted from the revised EO foreign nationals with a "bona fide
relationship" with a U.S. person or entity.274 Clarifying its order in
July, the Supreme Court held that the term, "bona fide relationship,"
included a broad range of relatives, including parents, children,
spouses, siblings, in-laws, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles,
nieces, and nephews, but did not include the refugee resettlement
agencies that had entered into sponsorship agreements regarding
particular persons abroad already granted refugee status.275 However,
after issuance of EO-3, the Supreme Court ruled that the challenges
to EO-2 filed in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits were moot. The Court
also vacated the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' decisions.
270. See id at 1157.
271. See EO-2, § 1(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
272. See id. § 3(a), at 13,213 (exemption of LPRs); id. § 3(b)(i), at 13,213
(exemption of VHs); id § 1(g), at 13,211 (list of nations affected); id § 6(c), at
13,215 (waiver provisions); id. § 6(b), at 13,216 (lowering refugee cap).
273. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017).
274. Id at 2088. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Gorsuch,
dissented from the portion of the stay order granting this relief to noncitizens
otherwise affected by the revised EO. Id at 2090 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
275. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34, 34 (2017); Peter Margulies,
Refugee EO Update: The Supreme Court Hands Each Side a Partial Victory,
LAWFARE (July 19, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/refugee-eo-update-
supreme-court-hands-each-side-partial-victory [https://perma.cc/8C79-734W]
(analyzing the Supreme Court's July 19 order); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
49, 49-50 (2017) (staying injunction that had barred implementation of EO-2 for
refugees whose only tie to the United States was through resettlement agency);
Trump v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 353, 353 (2017) (vacating decision below as moot).
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Because the earlier EOs were temporary, President Trump
issued EO-3 in September 2017.276 i contrast to the earlier EOs'
temporary duration, EO-3 is indefinite in duration, although it is
subject to review every 180 days. 277 In addition to being indefinite in
duration, EO-3 makes some changes to the mix of listed countries
and to the categories of foreign nationals from those countries
affected by the measure. It suspends entry of both immigrants and
some or all classes of nonimmigrants from Chad, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Syria, and Yemen. 27 8 The administration dropped Sudan from
the list. In addition, EO-3 bars the entry of immigrants from Somalia,
subjects Iraqi nationals to heightened screening, and bars
nonimmigrant entry of certain Venezuelan government officials and
their families. 27 9 To provide some room for official discretion despite
the restrictions, EO-3 also provides a waiver process, which requires
a foreign national otherwise covered by the EO to demonstrate that
the bar to entry would result in undue hardship, that she does not
present a threat, and that her entry would be in the national
interest. 28 0 EO-3 does permit the admission of most refugees 281 and
students, who receive nonimmigrant visas.
2. President Trump's Measures in Statutory Context
Under the INA, the legality of President Trump's measures
restricting entry hinges on reading the INA as a "harmonious
276. See generally EO-3, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
277. See id. § 4, at 13,215.
278. Id. § 1(g), at 13,211.
279. Id. §§ 1(g), 2(h)(ii), 2(f)(i), at 13,211-13.
280. Id. § 3(c), at 45,168. In December 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
Hawaii district court's injunction against EO-3. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 U.S. Lexis 759 (Jan. 19, 2018); see also
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis
3513 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (affirming Maryland district court's injunction against
EO-3). Earlier in December, the Supreme Court-without opining on the merits-
stayed all injunctions against EO-3 pending further review at the Court. See Trump
v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 542, 542 (2017).
281. President Trump also issued a new Executive Order on refugees that
was accompanied by a memorandum that allegedly suspended refugee admissions
and related immigration from several countries, including some also listed in EO-3.
See generally Doe v. Trump, No. C17-0178, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211377 (W.D.
Wa. Dec. 23, 2017) (invalidating provisions of refugee Executive Order and
accompanying memorandum that imposed categorical per-country limits on refugee
admissions and admission of close relatives accompanying or "following to join"
refugees).
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whole."282 That inquiry starts with three subsections that I detail
below. However, the inquiry ultimately involves a broader
consideration of the INA's structure and purpose.
The first provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (the "entry provision"),
authorizes the President to "suspend the entry of all aliens or any
class of aliens" when that entry is "detrimental to the interests of the
United States." 28 3 This provision, enacted during the Cold War as
part of the 1952 Immigration Act, was intended as a delegation to the
Executive to limit the admission of persons or groups that might
endanger U.S. security. 28 4 In a 1986 opinion, then-judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg characterized the President's authority under § 1182(f) as
"sweeping." 28 5 Reinforcing the Executive's discretion in visa
processing, in 1996 Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (the
"procedures provision"), which empowers the Secretary of State to
"determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa
applications,"2 8 6 including the location mandated for filing particular
documents.
282. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133
(2000).
283. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2013).
284. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1993)
(upholding order authorizing interdiction at sea of foreign nationals seeking to enter
the United States without a legal status); see generally Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d
745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that regulation requiring all postsecondary
students who were natives or citizens of Iran report regarding their status was
constitutional as response to Iran's seizure of U.S. embassy in Tehran); see also
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1507 (1lth Cir. 1992) (asserting that
§ 1182(f) "clearly grants the President broad discretionary authority to control the
entry of aliens into the United States"); Sesay v. INS, 74 Fed. App'x 84, 86-88 (2d
Cir. 2003) (deferring to administrative decision that appellant was not eligible for
asylum because presidential proclamation under § 1182(f) precluded his entry into
United States); cf Kate M. Manuel, Executive Authority to Exclude Aliens: In Brief
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 3-12 (2017) (discussing background and past practice
regarding § 1182(f)). The Supreme Court has also asserted in dicta that the power to
exclude foreign nationals is granted by Article II of the Constitution. See United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (asserting that
"exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty ... stem[ming] not alone
from legislative power but . . . inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation").
285. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Similar
authority resides in 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), which states that it is "unlawful . . . to
depart" or enter the United States except pursuant to "reasonable rules [and]
regulations" promulgated by the President. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (2012).
286. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (2012); see Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v.
Dep't of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that Secretary of State
had authority under this provision to prospectively require filing of certain
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However, the text, structure, and legislative history of the INA
also curb the President's discretion. In the groundbreaking 1965
Immigration Act, Congress added an anti-discrimination provision
declaring that no individual shall "be discriminated against in the
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's race, sex,
nationality, place of birth or place of residence."2 8 7 The exceptions to
the anti-discrimination provision are narrowly crafted.2 8 8 Congress
placed the nondiscrimination provision in the vital portion of the
statute that sets overall limits on annual legal migration to the United
States.2 89 Moreover, Congress in the 1965 amendments to the
immigration statute stressed the importance of family reunification
and a pivot from the discriminatory national origin quotas that had
shaped prior immigration law.2 90 In addition, Congress has prescribed
detailed provisions for the admission of nonimmigrants such as
students, tourists, and business visitors.2 91 Congress carefully
calibrated these nonimmigrant provisions to optimize the benefits to
Vietnamese asylum applications at consulates located in countries to which
applicants had been repatriated after initial negative screening, rather than in Hong
Kong). This decision was the culmination of extensive litigation, including an
argument in the Supreme Court prior to Congress's adding the "procedures"
provision to clarify the law. Id. at 1350-51; see also Josh Blackman, The Legality of
the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part I: The Statutory and Separation of Powers
Analysis, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Mar. 11, 2017),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/03/1 1/the-legality-of-the-3617-executive-order-
part-i-the-statutory-and-separation-of-powers-analyses/ [https://perma.cc/4254-
P497] (discussing course of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers litigation under "National
Origin Discrimination" heading, including government's discussion at Supreme
Court of need for executive discretion and Congress's role in overriding earlier
decision that curbed that discretion). In the litigation concerning Vietnamese asylum
seekers, the D.C. Circuit ultimately held that the designation of specific consulates
for receipt of Vietnamese asylum applications did not constitute prohibited
discrimination. See Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 104 F.3d at 1353 (holding that,
given Congress's enactment of "procedures" provision, it was "clear" that the
nondiscrimination provision did not bar the procedural decisions made by the
Secretary of State in that case).
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A).
288. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(D) (2014) (certain overseas employees of
the U.S. government, including certain Taiwanese nationals), id. § 1101(a)(27)(E)-
(G) (certain Panamanian nationals who performed work in the Panama Canal Zone
before or at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 ceding ownership of the
canal to Panama).
289. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (setting per-country level at seven percent of total
annual global immigration level for the family preference, employment, and
diversity immiigrant categories).
290. See infra notes 312-26 and accompanying text.
291. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2015).
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the country yielded by each kind of nonimmigrant. An indefinite bar
to entry of certain nonimmigrants upsets Congress's comprehensive
framework.
Reading § 1182(f) in light of the INA as a whole suggests
sensible limits on the President's authority. Section 1182(f) is
interstitial in character. It allows the President to act quickly and
decisively when situations require an exigent response.29 2 Under this
conception, temporary action will often be permissible. However,
indefinite or permanent actions require a more substantial
justification since those actions are more likely to interfere with the
INA's overall plan.
3. An Interstitial Use of Statutory Authority: EO-2 and
Congress's Framework
EO-3's predecessor, March 2017's EO-2, differed substantially
from EO-3 in temporal scope. While EO-3 is indefinite in duration-
albeit subject to review every 180 days-EO-2 was temporary. 29 3 Its
per country limits lasted only ninety days, while its bar on admission
of refugees lasted 120 days. The limited duration of EO-2
harmonized it with Congress's plan.
Recall that under the shared stewardship model, a court will
require that a challenged government action exhibit a close means-
end relation if that action: (1) does not serve the sovereign interests
of the United States, (2) imposes collateral impacts on U.S. persons
or institutions, and (3) has no limiting principle.2 94
Even in the absence of presidential action under § 1182(f), the
ordinary working of immigration law provides rudimentary security
safeguards when an immigrant seeks admission to the United States
at a port of entry such as an airport or border crossing. For example,
suppose an arriving noncitizen has a valid visa as an Immediate
Relative of a U.S. citizen. As mentioned in our earlier discussion of
consular processing and "extreme vetting," to grant that visa, a
consular official abroad would have had to also find that the
noncitizen was not excludable for any of the reasons set out in the
INA, such as commission of crimes abroad, the likelihood of
requiring public assistance, having a communicable disease such as
292. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2013).
293. See EO-2, § 1(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Cf EO-
3, § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,169 (Sept. 24, 2017).
294. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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tuberculosis, or a history of material support of foreign terrorist
groups.2 9 5 Nevertheless, despite this consular determination of
eligibility, an immigration official in the course of inspection at a
point of entry may determine that the noncitizen is inadmissible
based on new data or facts that the consular official missed.2 96
The President's power to deny "entry" under § 1182(f) gives
the President authority to address threats in a fashion that is more
tailored and proactive than the statutory bases for exclusion in the
INA itself.29 7 However, past practice illustrates that presidents have
used the power granted by § 1182(f) in a tailored, often temporary
way. Presidents have invoked § 1182(f) against relatively discrete
groups, such as associates of the former Panamanian leader, Manuel
Noriega.2 98 Presidents have also used § 1182(f) to address exigent
situations in foreign affairs. For example, President Carter invoked
the provision in order to require all Iranian postsecondary students in
the United States to report after the Iranian government held U.S.
Embassy personnel as hostages in 1979.299 President Reagan invoked
§ 1182(f) to halt most otherwise-eligible Cuban nationals' entry into
the United States after Cuba reneged on an immigration accord. 300In
addition, as the Supreme Court discussed in Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill
Clinton invoked § 1182(f) to interdict inadmissible foreign nationals
on the high seas heading for the United States.3 0 1 No prior President
had used § 1182(f) to indefinitely restrict the entry of otherwise
admissible nationals from multiple named countries, as President
Trump has sought to do.
Against this backdrop, the temporary bar to entry in EO-2
narrowly passed muster under shared stewardship, largely because of
its temporary nature. Consider the sovereign interests factor.
According to EO-2, the pause was designed to prevent further
admissions based on information that was not fully reliable, while
agencies such as the State Department, the Department of Homeland
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
296. See generally id. (detailing grounds of inadmissibility).
297. See id. § 1182(f).
298. See Manuel, supra note 284, at 10.
299. See Brief for Immigration Scholars at 24-29, Hawaii v. Trump, 878
F.3d 662 (2017) (No. 17-17168) (discussing past practice regarding § 1182(f)).
300. See Manuel, supra note 284, at 10. Presidents Carter and Reagan
tailored their decrees to exempt close relatives of U.S. citizens. See IRAP v. Trump,
2018 U.S. App. Lexis 3513, at 128-29 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018).
301. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 160-67 (1993).
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Security, and the Director of National Intelligence conducted a
"worldwide review" to determine what, if any, additional
information would be required from all or some foreign countries to
ensure that a visa applicant was not a "security or public-safety
threat."3 0 2 According to EO-2, each listed country was "a state
sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly compromised by terrorist
organizations, or contains active conflict zones."303
Turbulent country conditions can substantially impair refugee
and visa processing. When conditions are difficult, the information
deficits that complicate consular decisions and refugee
determinations3 0 4 become even more difficult to manage. For
example, turbulence may snarl access to records that substantiate a
visa application. As decision-makers working without documentation
rely more on applicants' own accounts, the risk of unreliable
narratives increases. The Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak v.
United States3 0 5 demonstrates that asylum claimants are not always
reliable narrators. In Maslenjak, an asylum applicant egregiously
misrepresented facts, casting her spouse as a victim of persecution
when in fact the applicant's spouse was complicit in horrendous
atrocities.30 6 Cases like Maslenjak illustrate that the effort to improve
screening is not inherently unreasonable or invidious. Nor is a pause
in entry to ensure proper screening of visa applicants from the
countries subject to such turbulent conditions on the ground.
A pause of reasonable duration would also be consistent with
shared stewardship's search for limiting principles. EO-2's stated
duration of ninety and 120 days for six-country nationals and
302. EO-2, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,212 (Mar. 6, 2017).
303. Id. § 1(d), at 13,210. See also id. § 1(e)(ii), at 13,211 ("Libya is an
active combat zone, with hostilities between the internationally recognized
govermnent and its rivals. In many parts of the country, security and law
enforcement functions are provided by armed militias .. . Violent extremist groups,
including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have exploited these
conditions . . . The Libyan government provides some cooperation with the United
States' counterterrorism efforts, but it is unable to secure thousands of miles of its
land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of weapons, migrants, and
foreign terrorist fighters.").
304. See Martin, supra note 25, at 184.
305. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017).
306. Id. (holding that trial judge had delivered improper instruction in trial of
defendant on making false statements to obtain naturalization, and noting that
defendant had lied to obtain asylum by asserting that her husband had sought to
avoid being drafted into the Bosnian Serb Army in the early 1990s and had suffered
persecution as a result, while in fact her husband had been an officer in a unit that
helped massacre 8,000 Bosnian civilians).
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refugees, respectively, demonstrated its limited scope. In its stay
order, the Supreme Court announced that it "fully expect[ed]" that
the government would finish its review and relay any new
requirements to foreign governments within the brief "life" of EO-
2.307 The Court's language strongly suggested that it would not
regard the "worldwide review" rationale as a colorable justification
for a new EO of the same scale or for seiatim temporary reviews.
Without a fresh rationale, shared stewardship would find that any
new, similar EO lacked an intelligible limiting principle.
Although collateral impacts alone will not invalidate a measure
under a shared stewardship test, the collateral impacts of EO-2 were
nonetheless substantial. As the Supreme Court's stay order
upholding portions of the injunctions against the revised EO made
clear, EO-2 had significant adverse consequences for U.S. persons.
Without the Court's modifications exempting from the EO
grandparents, grandchildren, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews,
and other relatives of U.S. persons,30 8 EO-2 would have adversely
affected U.S. relatives of noncitizens, who would have had to endure
delay in reuniting with family members.3 0 9 Moreover, although the
Court's orders regarding EO-2 did not reflect this,3 10 U.S. refugee
resettlement agencies providing sponsorship assurances to refugees
also suffered, since their operations and funding were interrupted. 3 1 1
307. Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017).
308. See id. (ruling that noncitizens abroad otherwise affected by refugee EO
were exempted if they had "bona fide relationship" with U.S. person or entity); see
also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34, 34 (July 19, 2017) (clarifying scope of stay
order).
309. The family members abroad, as foreign nationals with no other ties to
the United States, lack constitutional rights. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (holding that noncitizens abroad with no ties to the United
States lacked Fourth Amendment rights). The Supreme Court has held that foreign
nationals detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba-a facility under the
exclusive control of the U.S. military-have access to habeas corpus. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008). Cf Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1861-62 (2017) (citing Boumediene as connoting limits on the deference
accorded political branches' decisions about national security and foreign affairs).
The foreign nationals covered by the revised EO are not detained by the United
States. Therefore, holding that they are directly protected by the U.S. Constitution
would require an expansion of the Court's holding in Boumediene.
310. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 34 (declining to include refugee resettlement
agency assurances in category of "bona fide relationship" with U.S. person or entity
that under stay order required exemption from revised EO).
311. See Alex Aleinikoff, What Does the Supreme Court's Decision on the
Trump Executive Order Mean for Refugees?, PUB. SEMINAR (June 27, 2017),
57
Michigan State Law Review
4. The Perils ofIndefinite Executive Measures: The INA and
EO-3
In September 2017, EO-2 gave way to EO-3. The latter's
indefinite restrictions contrast sharply with EO-2's temporary
duration. In addition to imposing collateral impacts that are far more
severe than EO-2's, the indefinite character of EO-3's restrictions
undermine the sovereign interests articulated in the INA's "overall
scheme" and lack any coherent limiting principle.
Consider EO-3's clash with Congress's scheme. The
transformational 1965 Immigration Act amendments had two salient
features: They abolished the discriminatory national origin quotas
that had marred U.S. immigration law for four decades and
prioritized family reunification. The INA sets out a detailed
architecture for immigrant admissions that prioritizes close family
relationships.3 1 2 As the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee noted in its
report on the 1965 amendments, the revisions to the statute included
a "new system of allocation based on a system of preferences which
extends priorities . . . to close relatives of U.S. citizens and [LPRs],"
along with certain "members of the professions, arts, and sciences,"
those with skills or other attributes needed in the U.S. economy, and
refugees.3 13 In crafting a new system, the Committee's Report
declared that "[r]eunification of families is to be the foremost
consideration."3 1 4 Thus, in setting cnitenia for membership in the U.S.
community, Congress sought to serve the interests of U.S. citizens
and LPRs with close family members overseas.
By the same token, the 1965 amendments decisively rejected
the system of national origin discrimination that had governed the
issuance of immigration visas since 1924.315 These quotas governed
all areas of the world, apart from the Western Hemisphere.3 16
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress's own
experience demonstrated that the quota system lacked the "required
http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/06/what-does-the-supreme-courts-decision-on-
the-trump-executive-order-mean-for-refugees/#.WaQDXj6GOpo [https://perma.cc/
3ENZ-U6WQ] (arguing that the equitable balancing required in a stay order should
also respect the importance of refugee resettlement agency assurances to overall
refugee processing). Cf IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2087 (outlining standard for stay
pending appeal) (citing Nkenv. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009)).
312. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (2012).
313. See 1965 Senate Judiciary Comiittee Report, supra note 41, at 11.
314. Id. at 13.
315. See id. at 11-12.
316. Id. at 12-13.
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degree of flexibility" to "permit the reuniting of families."3 17 Because
of this shortcoming, the Committee noted, Congress had, in the past,
resorted to "special legislation" to be appropriately "generous and
sympathetic" to families' needs.3 18 The continued resort to such
special legislation since 1952 accounted for the admission of nearly
two-thirds of all immigrants entering the United States.3 1 9 In sparing
Congress from the need for this continual and disruptive recourse to
special legislation, the Judiciary Committee pointedly praised the
1965 amendments' replacement of the national origin quota system
with a family-based visa program that was to be "fair, rational,
humane, and in the national interest."3 20
The 1965 Judiciary Committee Report also stressed the
particularly adverse impact of quota provisions governing the so-
called Asia-Pacific triangle, which included China, Japan, Korea,
and other countries. Until 1952, racial restrictions in the immigration
statute had barred naturalization of most Asian noncitizens and
suppressed immigration.3 21 The 1952 statute, while eliminating race
as a bar, subjected nationals from the Asia-Pacific triangle to
particularly narrow and rigid quotas. A total of only 2,000 visas per
year were available to the aggregate of all countries in the region.322
Moreover, the 1952 Act also provided that the immigration to the
United States of persons of Asian ancestry anywhere in the world
would count against the 2,000-person quota applicable to the Asia-
Pacific triangle. In other words, persons of Asian descent who were
nationals of countries in other regions, such as Europe, Africa, the
Caribbean, or Latin America, had to fit within the 2,000-person
Asian-Pacific triangle quota.3 23 The 1965 amendments repealed all
vestiges of this noxious system.3 24 The Judiciary Committee report




321. Id. at 14.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 14-15. A few years before the 1965 amendments, Congress
removed the 2,000-person limit. However, it continued to subject immigration of
persons of Asian descent anywhere in the world to the limits of the new Asian-
Pacific triangle quota. Id.
324. Id. at 15.
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declared that in the future, there would be "no differentiation"'325 in
the treatment of Asian immigrants. 326
The 1965 legislation and other subsequent amendments also
consolidated the grounds for excluding foreign nationals from the
United States. Over time, the list of grounds for inadmissibility has
grown to include many factors, ranging from traditional factors like
likelihood of becoming a public charge 327 to the various terrorism
exclusions discussed by the Supreme Court in Kerry v. Din.328
Although the list has grown, Congress deliberated over all additions,
including the terrorism provisions added after September 11.
The "entry provision" cited by President Trump, § 1182(f), is
part of the statutory section that deals with grounds for
inadmissibility. 329 In times of crises or transnational disputes,
§ 1182(f) allows the President to fill gaps, acting interstitially to
supplement the express exclusion grounds in the statute or identify
particular individuals or groups whom consular processing might not
flag or whose entry might undermine other foreign policy goals.330
However, the logic and structure of Congress's detailed
inadmissibility provisions suggest that Congress has not delegated to
the President the power to create new standing additions to the
exclusion grounds. The de facto addition of exclusion grounds by
executive order would not fall under the rubric of statutory
implementation or enforcement. Instead, it would amount to
redrafting the statute itself.
EO-3 also exceeds the power delegated by Congress to set
"procedures" for visa issuance. 331 The "procedures" provision was a
legislative response to particular litigation involving the Secretary of
State's power to designate consulates for the receipt of Vietnamese
asylum claims. 3 3 2 The "procedures" provision would allow the
325. Id.
326. See Alan Hyde, The Nondiscrimination Obligation of Immigration and
Nationality Act Section 202(a) (1) (A) 1, 13, 18 (Rutgers Univ. School of L., Soc. Sci.
Research Network, Working Paper No. 2932605), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2932605 [https://perma.cc/AR56-K76R] (providing analysis
of the nondiscrimination provision in the INA).
327. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2013).
328. Id. § 1182(a)(3); see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131, 2140
(2015).
329. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
330. Id.
331. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
332. See Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep't of State, 104 F.3d 1349,
1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Blackman, supra note 286.
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government to obtain additional information from visa applicants.
For example, the administration could have established tailored
procedures that addressed potential information deficits by requiring
more explanation or documentation, including certifications by
government agencies in the applicant's country of origin or affidavits
from government officials. Further information requirements, such as
the disclosure of social media "handles" for some visa applicants,
might be appropriate to ensure that there is no evidence of
inadmissibility based on terrorist ties or other factors. However, EO-
3 goes well beyond setting procedures. It categorically bars virtually
all eligible applicants from most listed countries from receipt of
immigrant visas and some nonimmigrant visas. The possibility of a
shortfall in information about some visa applicants does not justify a
de facto material alteration in the INA's underlying substantive
criteria for visa eligibility and admission to the United States. The
"procedures" provision is too slender a reed to do this heavy work.33
EO-3's provision of waivers does not remedy its clash with the
INA. To obtain a waiver, a noncitizen from the affected countries
must show that: (1) denying entry would cause the noncitizen "undue
hardship"; (2) entry would not pose a threat to the United States; and
(3) entry would be "in the national interest."3 3 4 The waiver's test also
undermines the INA's framework. Consider the second criterion:
requiring the noncitizen show he or she is not a threat.3 35 Under usual
consular procedure, a consular official will review materials
submitted as a matter of course by the visa applicant, such as an
employment history or criminal record.33 6 If that history raises an
issue, the consular official will inquire further. For example, in Kerry
v. Din, the consular official apparently had questions about the
applicant's tenure as a clerk for a government office run by the
Taliban.3 3 7 However, beyond producing documents such as an
employment history, consular processing does not require that the
visa applicant prove a negative, i.e., that he or she is not a threat.
Proving a negative is often difficult. It is straightforward only
regarding health, where a doctor's exam will demonstrate the
absence of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. However,
333. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B).
334. EO-3, § 3(c)(i), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017).
335. Id. § 3(c)(i)(B), at 45,168.
336. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2013).
337. 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131-32 (2015).
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there is no doctor's exam for rebutting an administrative presumption
that an individual is a threat to national security.
The first and third waiver criteria introduce elements that do
not figure at all in visa decisions under the INA. Congress knew how
to require a showing of "hardship" under the statute.338 It has done so
in several other immigration provisions, such as the requirement that
undocumented noncitizens applying for a remedy called
"cancellation of removal" show "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to a close family member who is a citizen or LPR.339
However, the INA does not require any showing of hardship by
ordinary visa applicants overseas. Similarly, a visa applicant who
qualifies for a family-based, employment, or other visa and is not
excludable because of a criminal record, a communicable disease, or
other factors need not also show that his or her admission would be
in the "national interest" of the United States. The INA's scheme
treats this as a given if the visa applicant's admission promotes
family reunification with relatives in the United States, economic
competitiveness for U.S. businesses, or other purposes contemplated
by the statute. Requiring a further showing adds new hurdles to visa
processing that Congress has not intended.
In addition to its clash with the sovereign interests Congress
has carefully inscribed in the INA, EO-3 imposes substantial
collateral impacts on U.S. persons. Because of its indefinite duration,
EO-3's collateral impacts on U.S. citizens and LPRs far exceed the
effects wrought by EO-2's temporary restrictions. Moreover, EO-3
relies on an interpretation of the "entry" provision, § 1182(f), which
lacks an intelligible limiting principle.340 The temporary restrictions
in EO-2 at least had clear temporal end-points. In contrast, EO-3's
restrictions are indefinite. Damage to the INA from a temporary,
one-time restriction on admissions is inherently contained. The same
cannot be said of the imposition of indefinite restrictions that are
subject only to internal review within the executive branch.
5. EO-3 and More Searching Review
Since EO-3 does not fit shared stewardship's criteria for
relaxed review, it requires more searching scrutiny. EO-3 cannot
meet that more exacting standard. Its blunt means are far too
338. EO-3, § 3(c)(i)(A), 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,168.
339. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012).
340. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
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imprecise to effectively reduce foreign nationals' terrorism-related
conduct in the United States. In responding to this threat, EO-3
manages to be both markedly under- and over-inclusive.3 4 1 This is
true with respect to both its analysis of conditions in the listed
countries and the fit between its restrictions and the track-record of
foreign nationals in the United States who have committed terrorism-
related offenses.
First, consider the Proclamation's application of its stated
criteria regarding country conditions. 34 2 Those criteria are three-fold.
EO-3 purports to value a state's responsibility for identity-
management protocols, such as using electronic passports embedded
with the passport-holder's biographic and biometric data and
informing other countries and international organizations about lost
or stolen passports. Second, EO-3 purports to consider whether a
state shares national security and public-safety information, such as
data about terrorism or security threats. 34 3 Third, EO-3 cites the
importance of national security and public-safety risk assessment,
including whether a state accepts the return of its own nationals
when U.S. immigration officials have obtained a final order of
removal for those individuals.3
From one angle, EO-3 is notably over-inclusive.3 4 5 Several
countries affected by EO-3 use identity-management protocols of the
kind that the Proclamation requires. For example, four of the listed
countries-Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Venezuela-issue electronic
passports. 34 6 The international law enforcement agency, Interpol,
reported in 2014 that Iran was "very strong" in its efforts to share
information on lost or stolen passports,3 47 while Libya, Somalia,
Syria, and Venezuela all share substantial information. 3 48 With
respect to sharing national security and public-safety information,
341. See IRAP v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 610 (D. Md. 2017).
342. See EO-3, § 1(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,168.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See David Bier, Travel Ban Is Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective
Criteria, CATO AT LBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017, 2:07 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/
travel-ban-based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria [https://perma.cc/KM8U-
22NN]. Analyst David Bier of the Cato Institute has undertaken the most diligent
and methodical review of EO-3's criteria. See id.
346. See id; ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) Participants, INT'L CIV.
AVIATION ORG. (ICAO), https://icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-
PKDParticipants.aspx [https://perma.cc/8WCN-WA2T] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
347. See Bier, supra note 345.
348. See id.
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Chad and Yemen use a U.S.-devised system-the Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES)-to report terrorist incidents.349 While Iran does not use
this system, it does coordinate with the Iraqi government and with
Syria in the armed conflict with ISIS, in which the United States also
participates.350 It is logical to infer that such coordination entails
some information-sharing. Whether U.S. officials consider that
degree of information-sharing to be sufficient is difficult to discern
from the face of EO-3, which provides no objective baseline for this
factor regarding the frequency or volume of information-sharing
expected.
EO-3 is also over-inclusive regarding national security risk
indicators. One factor here is a country's willingness to permit
readmission of nationals of that country who have received final
orders of removal from the United States.351 Without that
cooperation, U.S. officials cannot effectively conduct removal of
noncitizens whose conducted has violated U.S. immigration laws.
Only one of the listed countries-Iran-has been listed recently as
failing to provide such cooperation.352
EO-3's list is also markedly under-inclusive in applying its
criteria to countries around the globe. Almost 100 countries-
including scores not on the list-did not issue electronic passports,
and many others permitted their nationals to use old paper passports
still in their possession.353 Moreover, over 150 countries either rarely
or never report lost or stolen passports to international authorities.354
In addition, all but one of the countries that fail to cooperate in
349. Id.; Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July
2017), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KT8A-ZTZN] (describing Chad and reporting on Yemen).
350. See Bier, supra note 345.
351. See EO-3, § 1(c)(iii), 83 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017).
352. See Bier, supra note 345.
353. See id.; ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) Participants, supra note
346.
354. See Bier, supra note 345; Passport Fraud: An International
Vulnerability: Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. (2014) (testimony of Alan Bersin, PLCY Office of Int'l Affairs Assistant Sec'y
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readmission of nationals subject to U.S. removal orders are not on
the list.3 5 5
EO-3's restrictions also fail to fit the pattern of terrorism-
related offenses in the United States. Noncitizens from the countries
listed in the Proclamation accounted for under fifteen percent of
terrorism-related federal offenses committed within the United
States, such as material support of a foreign terrorist group. 3 5 6 The
cohort of offenders from the listed countries was small in absolute
terms. Moreover, it represented an exceedingly small fraction of the
total number of individuals admitted to the United States from each
listed country. Since March 2011, the federal government has
documented terrorism-related conduct located primarily in the
United States-including acts of violence-involving approximately
forty foreign-bor individuals. 3 57 According to a draft study prepared
by the Department of Homeland Security, native-born U.S. citizens
were more likely to commit such offenses than foreign-born U.S.
persons from all other countries combined.358
Moreover, because terrorism is a low-incidence crime in which
base rates are very low in any national population, detecting signals
of terrorist tendencies in any such cohort is exceptionally difficult:
The sorting task is analogous to finding the proverbial needle in a
haystack. Compounding the problem, the bulk of foreign-born
individuals in the United States who had committed terrorism-related
offenses of any kind had been in the country for years prior to their
arrest, suggesting that more rigorous vetting would not have helped
355. Bier, supra note 345; Stephen Dinan, Trump Presses More Countries
Take Back U.S. Deportees in Immigration Success, WASH. TIMEs (May 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/16/countries-refusing-us-
deportees-cut-from-20-to- 12 [https://perma.cc/7YVP-SHXA].
356. See Most Foreign-born, US-Based Violent Extremists Radicalized After
Entering Homeland; Opportunities for Tailored CVE Programs Exist, OFF. OF
INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 5 (Mar. 2017),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trms-exclusive-dhs-document-
undermines-trump-case-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/S6FL-8J78] [hereinafter DHS
Draft Study II].
357. Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the
United States, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. 1 (2017), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/dhs-
7countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EL-2VN5] [hereinafter DHS Draft Study I]. This
group encompasses persons across a spectrum of immiigration and citizenship status.
See DHS Draft Study H1, supra note 356, at 3 (listing eighty-eight foreign-born
violent extremists between March 2011 and December 2016). The sample does not
include criminal conduct focused overseas, such as departing the United States to
join a terrorist organization. Id Those numbers are also small in absolute terms.
358. See DHS Draft Study I, supra note 357, at 1.
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identify such individuals.359 Furthermore, in this group, foreign
nationals from the countries covered by EO-3 were less than twenty-
five percent of the total.360 Those numbers indicate that EO-3 is
markedly under-inclusive in certain respects, omitting countries such
as Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kenya, Pakistan, and
Uzbekistan that together accounted for substantially more terrorism-
related conduct than countries listed in the Proclamation.36 1
In addition, EO-3 is markedly over-inclusive. For example, it
covers children under fifteen years of age.362 Beyond a disqualifying
communicable disease and a record of petty criminal offenses, it is
difficult to imagine that a minor below the age of fifteen could have
engaged in conduct that renders him or her inadmissible.
Nevertheless, EO-3 excludes members of this cohort, in effect
throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
In sum, EO-3's indefinite duration, impact on U.S. families,
and undermining of the INA disqualify it for shared stewardship's
deferential review. Consequently, assessment of EO-3 requires
application of a more searching standard. EO-3 lacks the precise
means-end fit required under this more robust review. It therefore
exceeds the power that Congress delegated to immigration officials.
6. EO-3 and the Establishment Clause
If President Trump's campaign, post-election, and post-
inaugural statements are at the very least part of the backdrop for a
statutory analysis of the revised EO, they play an even more
prominent role in addressing whether the revised EO clashes with the
Establishment Clause. Here, as with the statutory issue, both the
government and the EO's challengers have taken extreme positions.
The government has asserted that President Trump's statements are
simply irrelevant to the Establishment Clause issue.363 Il contrast, the
Fourth Circuit selected a skewed subset of statements by candidate,
359. See DHS Draft Study H1, supra note 356, at 7.
360. Id. at 5; see also EO-3, § 1(h)(ii), 83 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept.
24, 2017) (listing the countries included in the travel ban).
361. See DHS Draft Study H, supra note 356.
362. See EO-3, § 3(c)(iv)(E), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,169 (Sept. 24, 2017).
363. See Peter Margulies, The Fourth Circuit and the Refugee EO:
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President-elect, and President Trump and Trump surrogates.3 6 4 A
shared stewardship model would consider all of Trump's statements
but would require a uniform showing of religious animus absent in
this case to trigger more searching means-end scrutiny. In the multi-
dimensional arena of foreign affairs, requiring a lesser showing to
make out an Establishment Clause violation would license rampant
judicial second-guessing of legislative and executive decisions and
impair the sovereign interests of the United States.
As in the statutory context, it is useful to note that a legal
analysis that requires a uniform showing of religious animus does
not entail ethical, moral, or political support for statements made on
the campaign trail or subsequently by President Trump. One could
view even a single statement, such as then-candidate Trump's call
for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States,"36 as antithetical to the best view of American politics and
public service. However, a legal test should not engender unintended
consequences that undermine the Framers' goal of a "workable
government,"3 6 6 particularly in the complex realm of foreign policy.
That is where the EO critics' Establishment Clause arguments fall
short.
Application of the Establishment Clause to national security,
foreign policy, and immigration risks interference with sovereign
interests because of the multiplicity of factors that trigger
government action in this dynamic arena.3 67 The Establishment
Clause prohibits government actions intended to and likely to
produce injury or aid to religion.3 6 8 However, the Supreme Court has
oscillated between tests under the Establishment Clause, producing
little in the way of coherent guidance.3 6 9 The Court's kaleidoscopic
364. That court also interpreted ambiguous statements as favoring the EO's
challengers. Id.
365. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017).
366. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
367. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing "political branches' broad power" over immigration).
368. See Van Ordenv. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005).
369. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court
announced a test for an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 612-13 (stating that, to
withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, a measure (1) must have a "secular"
purpose, (2) cannot have a "primary effect" that "advances nor inhibits" religion,
and (3) must not promote "excessive government entanglement" with religion).
However, in Van Orden, the Court discounted the Lemon factors as "no more than
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Establishment Clause case law may have to suffice as a template for
the states, towns, and school districts that comprise the bulk of
Establishment Clause defendants. However, the scattered rays of
insight one can gather from this shifting jurisprudence do not serve
well as a template for a sound foreign policy.
For a graphic illustration of the Supreme Court's own reticence
in applying its complex Establishment Clause precedents to a case
with even modest national security ramifications, consider Salazar v.
Buono.370 In Salazar, Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of the
Court,371 found no violation of the Establishment Clause in
Congress's transfer of a small parcel of land within the Mojave
National Preserve to a private group to maintain a World War I
memorial featuring a Latin cross. After expressing doubt that the
"reasonable observer" test for government endorsement of religion
adequately addressed the importance of private religious
observance,372 Justice Kennedy noted that whether the cross
conveyed a sectarian message would be "assessed in the context of
all relevant factors."373 According to Justice Kennedy, the cross at
issue in Salazar "evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands
of small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans
who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the
fallen are forgotten."374 As a result, Justice Kennedy found that
invalidating the land transfer would not reflect the appropriate level
of "[r]espect for a coordinate branch of Government."375
Those same concerns should prompt even greater concern
when a measure comprises part of the ongoing foreign affairs of the
United States. A lower threshold for proving violations of the
Establishment Clause would cast doubt on many executive and
legislative moves in the foreign policy realm.376 Untangling religious
from neutral factors is a difficult task.
helpful signposts." 545 U.S. at 686 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973)).
370. See generally Salazarv. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
371. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice Kennedy's
opinion; Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred based on finding that the challenger
of the measure lacked standing. Id at 705, 729.
372. Id at 720.
373. Id at 721.
374. Id
375. Id
376. Establishment Clause cases hinging on official intent have a far
narrower focus on the religious observance or the sustenance of a religious
organization: For example, in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 848, 852
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In this regard, consider Congress's passage of the Lautenberg
Amendment, which requires that immigration officials presume that
Jews and Evangelical Christians from the former Soviet Union and
related states qualify for asylum.3 7 7 Under the Lautenberg
Amendment, the groups covered did not have to go through the
demanding asylum adjudication process required of other asylum
claimants alleging a well-founded fear of persecution based on
religion.3 78 In that sense, the Lautenberg Amendment gave an edge to
particular religious groups. Nevertheless, the distinctive treatment
authorized in this provision, along with subsequent amendments that
covered other groups such as religious minorities from Iran,37 9
allowed the political branches to craft a tailored response to changing
international political dynamics.38 0 Application of a rigid
Establishment Clause standard would have denied the political
branches this needed flexibility.
In addition, consider a significant event in post-World War II
U.S. foreign policy: President Truman's recognition of Israel.3 8 1
(2005), the Supreme Court invalidated a courthouse display of the Ten
Commandments that the legislature had endorsed "in remembrance and honor of
Jesus Christ." In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254-55 (1982), the Court struck
down a state law that limited religious congregations' ability to fundraise outside of
church services. Members of the legislature stated that the law targeted groups that
relied on public in-person solicitation of contributors; one legislator described his
colleagues as "hot to regulate the Moonies." Candidate and President Trump's
comments, while they are deplorable, do not address religious observance or
fundraising in this way.
377. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157 n.(b)(2)(A) (2017) (providing that "[a]liens who
are (or were) nationals and residents of an independent state of the former Soviet
Union or of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania and who are Jews or Evangelical
Christians shall be deemed" to be presumptive refugees).
378. Cf Michael J. Churgin, Is Religion Different? Is There a Thumb on the
Scale in Refugee Convention Appellate Court Adjudication in the United States?
Some Preliminary Thoughts, 51 TEX. INT'L L.J. 213, 215 (2016) (asserting that
"presumption of refugee eligibility" in the Lautenberg Amendment amounts to a
"thumb on the scale for certain religious groups" that mandates a less onerous
process than the one that typically applies in refugee adjudication).
379. See § 1157 n.(b)(1)(C).
380. Today, many of the beneficiaries of the Lautenberg Amendment and
subsequent provisions are Evangelical Christians from Ukraine fleeing violence in
that country. See Miriam Jordan, Soviet-Era Program Gives Even Unoppressed
Immigrants an Edge, N.Y. TiMEs (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/26/us/ukrainian-christian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/8V23-GNWM]
(citing refugee advocates' acknowledgment that this group is "still vulnerable to
persecution in pro-Russian areas" of Ukraine).
381. See Richard Holbrooke, President Truman's Decision to Recognize
Israel, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (May 1, 2008),
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Truman expressly recognized the creation of a "Jewish state" within
Israel's borders.38 2 Clark Clifford, Truman's close advisor and a
future Secretary of Defense under President Lyndon Johnson,
recalled that Truman was fond of citing Deuteronomy 1:8, in which
God decreed that the Israelites "go in and take possession of the land
[of] ... Abraham, . . . Isaac, and . . . Jacob." 383 One of Truman's
motivations was the intent to help Judaism survive and prosper.
According to Clifford, Truman also articulated "moral and ethical"
factors supporting "the foundation of a Jewish state."3 84
Under the Establishment Clause theory propounded by the
EO's challengers, courts would also entertain challenges to decisions
such as Truman's. If courts agreed that the Lemon test was the proper
vehicle for this challenge, plaintiffs would be allowed to conduct
discovery on whether Truman had an appropriate secular purpose
that outweighed his religious sentiments and whether the "primary
effect" of the recognition decision was to help or hinder religion.
Madison, who in Federalist No. 41 counseled vigilance regarding the
hostile "exertions" of foreign powers, would have expressed alarm at
using litigation to second-guess such fundamental foreign policy
decisions.385
In addition to inhibiting U.S. foreign relations, the
Establishment Clause challenge to the revised refugee EO also lacks
intelligible limits. That absence of limits is clearest on the standard
for using the statements of a political candidate or public official.




383. See id. (quoting Deuteronomy 1:8).
384. Id.
385. TE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 15, at 257. Cf Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (cautioning that allowing suits for damages could chill
official decision-making in sensitive areas). While Abbasi's analysis may have
overshot the mark in that case, its relevance to a lawsuit and discovery regarding
recognition decisions is manifest; one could argue that recognition decisions are so
wrapped up in the President's power to conduct foreign relations under Article II of
the Constitution that special rules should limit Establishment Clause challenges in
that arena. Cf Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that
President had exclusive power to decide how questions involving the status of
Jerusalem affected the listing of place of birth on a U.S. citizen's passport, despite
legislation to the contrary). However, a rule distinguishing recognition decisions
from other foreign policy matters for Establishment Clause purposes would cause
significant line-drawing problems that courts generally seek to avoid. See Chesney,
supra note 7, at 1396.
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relevant would provide no check at all, the challengers' approach,
largely adopted by the Fourth Circuit, fails to address the core
problem with using politicians' campaign statements: Campaigns are
fluid processes in which a candidate's statements can vary depending
on his or her opponents, the audience, or different paragraphs in a
single speech.
As an illustration, consider the words of a President rightly
recognized as among the best: Franklin D. Roosevelt. Historians
often remember Roosevelt as the patron saint of deficit spending,
who pioneered scores of social programs to get people back to work
during the Great Depression.386 However, as the Princeton historian
Julian Zelizer has argued, in the 1932 election, Roosevelt's
commitment to social programs did not deter him from campaigning
against then President Herbert Hoover's supposed fiscal
extravagance-although Hoover's spending was nowhere near the
levels Roosevelt would reach after he moved into the White
House.387 A complete picture of Roosevelt's approach would have to
examine each strand of his statements-but that picture was
incomplete until Zelizer's work more than fifty years after
Roosevelt's passing. It is doubtful that contemporary courts could
have done full justice to Roosevelt's subtly shifting remarks.
Similarly, Roosevelt was a moving target on the next great
crisis he faced: America's role in World War II. In 1940, World War
II was already raging, but the United States was on the sidelines,
kept there by a Congress and public that was wary of foreign
entanglements. Just before the 1940 election, Roosevelt appeared at a
Boston campaign rally to speak on the subject of America's military
capabilities.388 Roosevelt told the crowd to recognize the "obvious"
fact that the war posed "dangers to all forms of democracy
throughout the world."38 9 Nevertheless, lest the crowd think
Roosevelt was issuing this warning to signal an intent to enter the
386. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, "Securing" the Nation: Law, Politics,
and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
587, 687 (2009) (discussing contemporary opposition to Roosevelt's "social welfare
programs").
387. See Julian E. Zelizer, The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal
Conservatism and the Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1938, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.Q. 331, 335 (2000).
388. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States 1933-1945,
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conflict, Roosevelt also assured the crowd that, "Your boys are not
going to be sent into any foreign wars."390
Less than two months before the speech, Roosevelt had agreed
in the so-called "Destroyer Deal" to send Britain fifty outmoded U.S.
Navy destroyers in exchange for the ability to maintain bases in
British possessions such as Antigua and Bermuda.3 9 1 To keep the
political running room he needed, Roosevelt had to accompany all
such initiatives with the disclaimer he issued in Boston about
avoiding a U.S. combat role.39 2 A contemporary court may have
found this single speech in Boston as difficult to parse as Roosevelt's
conflicting statements about government spending. However, that
ambiguity was a feature, not a bug, in Roosevelt's efforts to prepare
the public for a larger U.S. role in the conflict, which came slightly
over a year later with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Contemporaneous judicial efforts to discern Roosevelt's authentic
meaning could only have frustrated Roosevelt's canny strategy.
While few would confuse President Trump with Franklin
Roosevelt, the Fourth Circuit did not consider the full range of
candidate Trump's remarks on matters related to the revised refugee
EO. Judge Gregory, writing for the court, cited the "numerous
occasions" on which candidate Trump urged a "total and complete
shutdown" of Muslim immigration.3 9 3 However, newspaper accounts
readily available to the court, but omitted from its opinion, showed
twists and turns in Trump's position. In May 2016, Trump said the
proposed complete ban was "just a suggestion" and he was open to
other ideas.39 4 In June and July 2016, Trump called for immigration
measures tied to particular nations and "territory" where terrorism
and armed conflict were prevalent.39 5
390. Id.
391. See Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule
ofLaw, and National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 642, 666 (2007).
392. See id. at 667-68.
393. See IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017).
394. See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not
Rolling It Back, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-
rolling-it-back/?utm term=.6944ccel8cdc [https://perma.cc/W5PH-LR3 S].
395. See id. This rationale was an early variant of the rationale in the revised
EO, stressing information deficits in dealing with countries that were embroiled in
domestic armed conflicts or were state sponsors of terrorism. See EO-2, § 1(d), 82
Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,210 (Mar. 6, 2017). Assuming an absence of uniform
statements showing religious animus, the Revised EO's rationale would be
consistent with the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard affirmed by Justice
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Then-candidate Trump may well have been deceptive or
insincere. However, as the Franklin Roosevelt example illustrates,
sincerity in statecraft is a relative term, and even deception
sometimes yields benefits for the public interest. Before embarking
on electoral hermeneutics, courts should determine if their approach
will usefully address Rooseveltian ambiguity, as well as Trumpian
bluster. At the very least, the Fourth Circuit should have conducted a
comprehensive inventory of Trump's campaign statements and
distinguished those that didn't fully fit the attribution to Trump of
anti-Muslim animus. 396 The court failed to undertake this task,
despite the availability of press accounts supplying such information.
This gap proves that dissenting Judge Niemeyer was right to call out
the majority's "unbounded"397 negative implications for judicial
methodology.
A shared stewardship approach would steer clear of the Fourth
Circuit's unbounded venture into campaign semiotics while retaining
the ability to consider a uniform pattern of statements over time. 398
Suppose that campaign and post-election statements indicated a
uniform, longstanding purpose to either help or hinder a religious
group. Having examined the complete record and made that
determination, a court could then insist that the government show a
closer means-end fit for the challenged measure.399
This approach would preserve sovereign interests over foreign
affairs and offer an intelligible limiting principle for judicial forays
into campaign hermeneutics. It would recognize that all officials who
appear in public occasionally make statements that are ambiguous,
hasty, or tailored to a particular audience. Finding a uniform and
comprehensive pattern of statements reflecting the intent to help or
hurt a religion indicates that the official in question has failed the test
of stewardship, warranting heightened judicial scrutiny. Subjected to
Kennedy in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (quoting Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)).
396. Compare IRAP, 857 F.3d at 594, with Johnson, supra note 394.
397. See IRAP, 857 F.3d at 650; see also Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d
1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (noting that "[c]andidates say many things on the campaign trail; they are
often contradictory or inflammatory").
398. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
399. This test is narrower than the broader standard urged by some
commentators. See generally Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential
Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REv. 71 (2017) (arguing that courts can consider
presidential speech when inquiring into purpose, without proposing limits on that
consideration).
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the full pressure of the Lemon test and failing the secular purpose
prong, the revised EO would then fall by the wayside.400
400. President Obama's initiatives would encounter a mixed reception under
the shared stewardship model. Pursuing the commendable policy goal of
compensating for Congress's failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform,
the Obama administration authored two important programs: Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA) and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA). See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland
Sec., to Le6n Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Sers., Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Jmmiigration & Customs Enf't, and R. Gil
Kerlikowske, Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120 memo deferred actio
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TUG-TBUG] (announcing DAPA); Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/N6WZ-WLGP] (last updated Jan. 13,
2018).
DAPA was the larger program by a substantial margin; it entailed
granting work authorization and a renewable reprieve from removal to over four
million of the roughly 11 million undocumented noncitizens in the United States.
Primarily because of its scale, DAPA would not have fared well under any of the
shared stewardship criteria. Its most glaring flaw was its lack of intelligible limits.
As with any administrative measure, DAPA had to fit into the "harmonious whole"
of the INA. FDAv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
Congress has regularly sought to curb executive discretion on reprieves from
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2012) (curbing executive practice of
granting "extended voluntary departure" (EVD) to noncitizens without a legal
status). Congress's effort to cabin executive discretion on reprieves from removal
would make little sense if immigration officials could circumvent these limits by
announcing a sweeping new program. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134,
178-82 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016);
Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds ofAgency Discretion: Reconciling
Policy and Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 159
(2015) (observing that, "[h]aving balked at the relatively modest discretionary
benefits provided by EVD . . . Congress would surely bridle at the cornucopia of
benefits provided by DAPA"); see also Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of
DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 213, 216
(2015) (arguing that DAPA overstepped presidential authority).
DACA presents a different case with clearer limits. It granted relief
from removal and work authorization to a substantially smaller group:
undocumented children whose parents brought them to the United States.
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra.
Noncitizens in this group had no control over their parents' decision to enter the
country without a legal status. Id. In addition, DACA recipients have developed
close ties to the United States and often have virtually no connection to their
nominal countries of origin. Id. Relief for this group is thus closer to the narrowly
tailored relief from a range of hardships, including serious illness, disability, and
extreme youth or old age, that has long been a mainstay of the immigration system.
See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
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D. Retroactive Application of Removal Grounds: Against Playing
"Gotcha!"
Since our discussion of shared stewardship thus far has
centered on persons located abroad, it is appropriate in this final
Section to address the rights of noncitizens already here. A perennial
issue alluded to earlier has been the retroactive effect of changes in
immigration law. For over a century, the Supreme Court has agreed
that Congress can make immigration laws retroactive if it states its
intent clearly.4 0 1 The shared stewardship model departs from this
longstanding default, precluding Congress from retroactively
applying new criteria for the removal of noncitizens.402
The Supreme Court's decision in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy403
is perhaps the most extensive modem statement of the reasons for
permitting retroactive removal criteria. Writing for the Court, Justice
Jackson asserted that the United States' sovereign interest in the
effective "conduct of foreign" policy40 4  justified retroactive
application of a removal provision based on the noncitizens' past
membership in the Communist Party. The longtime LPRs ordered
removed in Harisiades had each terminated their membership in the
Communist Party years prior to Congress's expressly designating
past membership as a basis for removal.4 0 5 Application of the ground
to the noncitizens who challenged their removal in Harisiades upset
reliance interests that the Court has generally sought to honor, at
least in the statutory context. However, faced with a clear statement
from Congress, the Harisiades Court held that due process did not
require limiting Congress to prospective application.4 0 6
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 2, 55, 63 (2015). But see Robert
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's
Nonenforcement oflmmigration Laws, the DREAMAct, and the Take Care Clause,
91 TEX. L. REv. 781, 783-84 (2013) (arguing that DACA exceeded presidential
authority).
401. Justice Holmes stated this in typically blunt fashion. See Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (citing Johnannessen v. United States, 225 U.S.
227, 242 (1912)) (noting that deportation was not punishment and therefore was not
included within the constraints of the Ex Post Facto Clause; deportation is "simply a
refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it does not want").
402. The Court has long read ambiguous immigration statutes as only
applying prospectively. See Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 261 (2012);
Morawetz, supra note 181, at 140; Motomura, supra note 181, at 568.
403. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
404. See id.
405. See id. at 593.
406. See id. at 591.
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To justify this stark holding, Justice Jackson resorted to what
Professor Hiroshi Motomura has called the "contract theory" of
immigration.407 Under this theory, legal immigrants know that the
United States has admitted them under certain conditions and with
certain background understandings.408 One such understanding is that
immigrants are merely probationary members of U.S. society. As
such, they are subject to both the removal grounds in place at the
time of their admission and those grounds that Congress has seen fit
to add later, including removal grounds that based deportation on
conduct the noncitizen engaged in before the legislation became
effective. For Jackson, the immigrant consented to these conditions,
harsh though they might be in particular settings like those that
prevailed in Harisiades itself.409 That consent made retroactive
application fair.
Arguing that the bargain here was not one-sided, Justice
Jackson claimed that the noncitizen gained from his or her
probationary status prior to naturalization. According to Jackson, the
noncitizen, unlike a U.S. citizen, could marshal the diplomatic efforts
of a foreign power on his or her behalf.410 Moreover, Jackson noted,
the noncitizen did not incur certain risks of citizenship, such as
exposure to conscription into the armed forces of the United States.
These benefits, Jackson asserted, made the "contract" entered into by
the arriving noncitizen a fair one, despite what in other contexts the
Court would view as the unfairness of retroactive legislation.411
Justice Jackson's account both exaggerated the benefits of
noncitizens' probationary status and muted the adverse consequences
of that status. Let us consider the latter first, through shared
stewardship's focus on collateral impacts. Permitting retroactive
laws undermines the legislative process and diminishes the
productivity of noncitizens. In each respect, Justice Stevens' opinion
for the Court in INS v. St. Cyr412 is a valuable guide. Justice Stevens
was troubled by the prospect that Congress could legislate
retroactively "as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or
407. See id. at 585; MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 9-11 (describing the
contract theory of imnigration).
408. See MOTOMURA, supra note 8, at 9-11.
409. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587.
410. See id. at 585-86.
411. Id.
412. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (providing guidance
on legislative processes and productivity of noncitizens).
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individuals."413 According to Justice Stevens, retroactive legislation
also deprives people of "confidence about the legal consequences of
their actions."414 Just as Hamilton predicted that unfair laws would
"sap the foundations of public and private confidence,"4 15 Justice
Stevens expressed concern that retroactive application would
undermine our "free, dynamic society"416 and suppress "creativity in
both commercial and artistic endeavors."417
The supposed benefits of immigrant status that Justice Jackson
invoked in Harisiades do not outweigh these burdens.418 While in
theory a foreign national can call upon his or her government for
protection, foreign governments have rarely been effective in halting
the removal of noncitizens from the United States.419 Similarly,
international law is of modest help. Even basic rights to be accorded
foreign nationals under international law, such as notification of that
individual's consulate in the United States in the event the noncitizen
is arrested, have been ignored or minimized by some U.S.
jurisdictions. 420 The erratic and unreliable benefits provided by
international law hardly outweigh the costs of retroactive application
for noncitizens.
Along with adverse collateral impacts, permitting retroactive
application of removal grounds has no limiting principle. In
Harisiades, removal subjected longtime legal residents of the United
States to a wrenching shift that the Court itself has described as
413. See id. at 315. Cf id at 315 n.39 (explaining vulnerabilities of
noncitizens). As a judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Neil Gorsuch
eloquently stated similar views. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142,
1146 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting due process concerns with retroactive application,
since "retroactive application of new penalties to past conduct that affected persons
cannot now change denies them fair notice of the law and risks endowing a
decisionmaker expressly influenced by majoritarian politics with the power to single
out disfavored individuals for mistreatment").
414. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (quoting Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994)).
415. See THEFEDERALISTNo. 78, supra note at 15, at 470.
416. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316 (citing Landgraf 511 U.S. at 265-66).
417. See id.
418. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585-86 (1952).
419. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001), the Court noted that
an effective tack for a country was to refuse to accept the repatriation of its own
nationals after those individuals had received final orders of removal. However, the
impact of this step is limited; it may result in the noncitizen's release from detention,
but it will not modify the underlying removal order.
420. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 530-32 (2008) (holding that treaty
requiring consular notification and establishing safeguards for criminal defendants
denied this right was not self-executing and thus not enforceable in federal court).
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being "the equivalent of banishment."4 2 1 Retroactive application of
removal grounds may often be harsher in practice than the ex post
facto criminal laws that the Constitution forbids. Criminal laws may
provide only modest penalties, depending on the sentences
prescribed. In contrast, removal of longtime residents is in effect a
life sentence of exile from relationships and commitments that may
have evolved over decades. 422
Finally, it is far from clear that the power to retroactively apply
removal criteria materially aids the United States' sovereign
interests. On the level of design, barring retroactive application
would impair the nation's ability to rethink removal criteria. That
consequence is not trivial, as the addition of removal grounds after
September 11 demonstrates. However, one should not overstate these
costs. Consider one post-9/11 addition to the INA: the addition of
terrorism-related offenses such as material support of a terrorist
organization.4 2 3 In dealing with this problem, the government has
many tools at its disposal if the individual persists in the activity,
including criminal prosecution.4 2 4 Moreover, if the individual who
may have engaged in material support is still a noncitizen, the
government can also resort to prospective application of removal
grounds if the conduct in question recurs.4 2 5 i other words, the
added value of retroactive application does not yield significant gains
in addressing exigent situations.
Moreover, on the issue of the design of removal grounds,
permitting retroactive application sends a discordant message. As the
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause demonstrates, disdain for
retroactive legislation is a foundational commitment of American
governance.426 Ignoring this principle in order to target a politically
vulnerable group suggests that our passion for avoiding unfairness is
421. Fong Haw Tanv. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
422. See Aleinikoff, supra note 146, at 244 (noting "actual relationships the
individual has developed with a society . . . [including] a family, friends, a job,
association memberships, professional acquaintances, opportunities").
423. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2012).
424. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (prohibiting material support of terrorist
activity); § 2339B (prohibiting material support of foreign terrorist groups); see also
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (upholding material
support law against First Amendment challenge).
425. Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 273-74 (2012).
426. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 138 (1810) (explaining that this
provision, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Contracts Clause were designed by
the Framers to counter legislators' penchant for "violent acts which might grow out
of the feelings of the moment").
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disconcertingly contingent, rather than constitutive. Giving the
political branches the power to send that deflating message
undermines the abiding sovereign interests of the United States. To
safeguard those interests, shared stewardship would rule out
retroactive application of removal grounds.
CONCLUSION
The retroactivity of removable grounds is a case study in the
difficulty of deriving clear and coherent rules on judicial review of
immigration law. Indeed, in some ways that issue understates the
dimensions of the problem. At least in the retroactivity arena, courts
have arrived at a consensus: interpret ambiguous statutes to permit
only prospective application, while upholding retroactive application
when Congress issues a clear statement. As we have just seen, there
are persuasive arguments that the consensus is wrong. However, at
least in this area, its parameters are clear for courts, policymakers,
and the public.
The same cannot be said for other areas of immigration law.
The judicial response to President Trump's refugee EOs has thus far
highlighted the lack of guidance in case law and commentary
regarding executive power. Concerns about the "extreme vetting"
that will accompany EO-3 exacerbate this problem. The attenuated
nature of the Court's rationale for distinguishing the gender-based
citizenship statute struck down in Sessions v. Morales-Santana from
valid gender-based statutes has increased the puzzlement of
stakeholders.
The prime candidates for supplying that guidance have
problems of their own. The deference that the Court has long
invoked does not fit the close means-end scrutiny deployed in
Morales-Santana or the fine adjustments that the Court made in its
stay order in IRAP v. Trump.427 The normalization thesis, which
would generally require the same close means-end nexus of
immigration measures that courts already require for domestic laws,
unduly discounts the nation's concern with the composition of the
community and the exigencies of foreign policy. A stable, normative
regime will not stem from either mechanical deference or the failure
to acknowledge immigration's genuine differences from wholly
domestic law.
427. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017); Trump
v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-88 (2017).
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Shared stewardship seeks to fill the gap. To address whether
heightened judicial review is appropriate, shared stewardship
considers three factors conjunctively: (1) degree of sovereign
interest, (2) number and intensity of collateral impacts, and (3)
absence of intelligible limits. 4 28 Each factor figures in the Framers'
thought and the Supreme Court's case law, although the latter
sometimes elevates the perceived foreign policy aspects of a
challenged measure and downplays concern with collateral impacts
and intelligible limits. Balanced attention to all three factors will lead
to a clearer and more cohesive model ofjudicial review.
In at least two important areas-vetting of visa applicants by
consular officials and retroactive application of removal grounds-
shared stewardship's criteria lead to different results than current
case law. Shared stewardship would prohibit vexatious or unduly
onerous requests for information from consular officials to visa
applicants and bar retroactive application of newly enacted removal
provisions. In reaching those different results, shared stewardship is
more skeptical than current case law about the foreign affairs
implications of certain immigration decisions and more concerned
with requiring a floor of fairness that will both discipline the political
branches and send a positive signal to the rest of the world. Shared
stewardship would also view EO-3 as inconsistent with the INA
because of the absence of a limiting principle governing the EO's
indefinite restrictions.
Shared stewardship will not eliminate close cases in
immigration law. Nor will it end debates about the degree of
deference that courts display. However, shared stewardship will
ensure a judicial role in key areas where that role has until now been
muted. Moreover, shared stewardship will enlist the courts' capacity
for judgment without unduly intruding on U.S. sovereign interests.
Given immigration law's importance for the near future under
President Trump and the longer term flourishing of the American
experiment, achieving that balance is worth the effort.
428. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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